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Transactions in the peer-to-peer sharing economy carry high risk and uncertainty. 
Consumers exchange with non-professional providers with whom they have no past 
history, and must rely on ratings and reviews for choice selection. However, there is a 
large positive bias in the ratings, making differentiation difficult, and causing some 
consumers to lose trust. Despite these concerns, little progress has been made to 
demonstrate the cause of the bias or how it can be fixed. I address this gap by 
demonstrating that consumers evaluate peer-peer experiences based on trust. This trust 
evaluation, in concert with network and social factors, contributes to the bias.  
 
Research on service evaluation is often informed by the expectancy disconfirmation 
process (Oliver, 1980, 2010). Consumers compare a provider’s performance against prior 
expectations; the resultant satisfaction or dissatisfaction leads to online ratings. I 
demonstrate that the process works differently for peer-to-peer services; a consumer’s 
determination of whether a provider met expectations has an effect on ratings beyond the 
effect of satisfaction (Study 1). When uncertainty and risk are high, a provider 
demonstrates that they can be trusted by meeting a consumer’s prior expectations (Study 
2). Contextual factors in peer-to-peer networks cause consumers to feel that their ratings 
are more important to peer providers, and that they may need to justify ratings. This 
elevates trust as an important driver of ratings at the expense of satisfaction, because 





Consumers may give peer providers positive ratings even if performance is worse than 
expected. Standards of evaluation are relatively unclear for peer-to-peer services (making 
it more difficult to identify performance failure), and social norms of gratitude and 
empathy motivate consumers to forgive peer providers for unreliable service (Studies 4 
and 5). Negative ratings for peer providers may result only if consumers believe that a 
provider caused and controlled a negative outcome, which suggests a lack of integrity 
(Study 6). I demonstrate that platforms can attenuate the positive bias by making ratings 
anonymous, by clearly defining service standards, and by increasing perceived 
controllability by providers for expectations and performance failure. 
 
 
Keywords: Trust, Satisfaction, Expectancy Disconfirmation, Online Reviews, Peer-





Summary for Lay Audience 
 
The peer-to-peer sharing economy is growing quickly behind platforms such as Airbnb 
and Uber that help people rent or share their skills and belongings with other consumers. 
Online ratings and reviews are extremely important for consumers of peer-to-peer 
services because they establish trust with unknown (and mostly non-professional) 
providers. However, nearly all peer-to-peer ratings are five-stars, which makes it difficult 
for consumers to distinguish between providers. It suggests that peer-to-peer ratings may 
be biased, and may not reflect a provider’s true quality. I attempt to determine the cause 
of this positive ratings bias, and provide solutions to fix the bias. 
 
The dissertation is comprised of six studies. I first explore how consumers of peer-to-peer 
services evaluate their experiences differently than consumers of traditional services. 
Research shows that for consumers who rent from a traditional business, their satisfaction 
is the main driver of the ratings decision. I show that this is not true for peer-to-peer 
services (Study 1). In peer-to-peer services, consumers experience higher feelings of risk 
and uncertainty because they are dealing with strangers. I show that when risk and 
uncertainty are high, a provider who meets a consumer’s expectations demonstrates their 
trustworthiness (Study 2).  
 
Next, I demonstrate that the feeling of trust in the provider is directly reflected in peer-to-
peer ratings and may lead to positive ratings even when performance is worse than 




traditional services that cause peer-to-peer consumers to feel that they need to justify their 
ratings decisions, and to feel gratitude and empathy toward peer providers (Studies 3-5). 
This leads to high ratings even if a consumer is relatively unsatisfied, as long as the 
provider was relatively trustworthy. I show that peer-to-peer consumers give low ratings 
only if they feel that an untrustworthy provider caused and could have prevented a 
service failure (Study 6), but that it is difficult for peer-to-peer consumers to make these 
assessments. Recognizing this, I test three ways that platforms can reduce the ratings bias 
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This research is inspired by my experience as a consumer of peer-to-peer services in the 
sharing economy. I have a background in brand management, and am fascinated by how 
peer providers can attempt to demonstrate their quality and trustworthiness to potential 
customers without the benefit of traditional signals (e.g., brand names, logos, or seals-of-
approval; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985). Ratings and reviews are the primary means of 
provider differentiation in the sharing economy but, as demonstrated in the following 
anecdote, a positive bias in peer-to-peer ratings makes ex ante evaluation difficult and 
could lead to a dissolution of trust. 
 
Dave is heading to another city for a one-night stopover. Rather than rent a hotel room, 
he’d rather just rent a room in someone’s home through AirBnB. He has heard this is a 
good option, but worries about sharing space with a stranger. When he goes on the site, 
he notices that most (if not all) of the hosts are rated five stars, which makes him wonder 
how useful the reviews are. He just isn’t sure that he can trust a stranger to host him. 
 
The peer-to-peer sharing economy has fundamentally changed how many people 
consume products and services. Sharing economy platforms like Airbnb and Uber have 
experienced tremendous growth, and the industry now represents a significant share of 




facilitate exchanges between consumers and non-professional (i.e., peer) providers who 
share or rent “underutilized assets from spaces to skills to stuff” (Botsman, 2013). 
Consumers gain temporary access to a provider’s goods and services, which has 
implications for risk, reputation, and trust (Eckhardt et al., 2019). The most important 
factor for the continued growth of the sharing economy is trust (Cheng, 2016; Ter Huurne 
et al., 2017), because of the relatively high levels of risk and uncertainty. Peer-to-peer 
exchanges take place between strangers (Schor, 2014), often with little institutional 
controls such as formal screening or guarantees (Belk, 2013). Exchanges that begin 
online may proceed into private homes and vehicles, contributing to performance, 
property, and safety risks.  
 
For consumers who don’t have the benefit of past experience with a provider, the online 
review system is the critical source of reputation and trust. To be effective, consumers 
must perceive the feedback system to be unbiased (i.e., it provides an honest, accurate 
reflection of past behavior) and diagnostic (i.e., it is helpful for differentiating between 
providers). However, despite a high level of heterogeneity in provider quality, the 
overwhelming majority of peer-to-peer reviews and ratings are positive. For example, 
94% of Airbnb properties were rated at 4.5 stars or higher (Zervas et al., 2015), and 90% 
of UberX trips were given 5 stars (Athey et al., 2018). This extreme distribution suggests 
that peer-to-peer ratings may be biased because they do not reflect the true quality 
differences between providers (Bridges & Vásquez, 2016). The likely result is that very 
high average ratings may cause consumers to become skeptical of feedback accuracy 




ratings makes it difficult to distinguish quality differences. This can erode trust, and 
consumers may respond to poor quality experiences by leaving the platform (Nosko & 
Tadelis, 2015).  More research is critically needed to explain the positive bias in peer-to-
peer ratings and to determine how to fix it. The goal of this dissertation is to illustrate 
how the differences between peer-to-peer and commercial services affect how consumers 
evaluate peer-to-peer experiences, and to show why this leads to a positive bias in ratings. 
I then propose and test different solutions to fix the bias and reduce the average rating.   
 
With the six studies included in this dissertation, I demonstrate that the performance 
evaluation process works differently for peer-to-peer services than for services delivered 
by commercial businesses. The traditional view of performance evaluation is the 
expectancy disconfirmation model (Oliver, 1980). The model proposes that a consumer 
evaluates a service experience against their prior expectations. This leads to feelings of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and those feelings affect the ratings decision. However, I 
show that for peer-to-peer services, a consumer’s evaluation of whether the provider met 
expectations affects ratings beyond the impact of satisfaction (Study 1). Specifically, I 
demonstrate that expectancy disconfirmation can lead to perceptions of trust. The 
inherent uncertainty and risk in peer-to-peer sharing increase the importance of meeting 
expectations. Providers that meet expectations in an uncertain and risky environment 
demonstrate that they can be trusted, and this trust is reflected in a consumer’s rating of 
the provider (Study 2). Understanding that peer-to-peer ratings are affected by trust (in 
addition to satisfaction), I next show how this evaluation can lead to highly positive 




even sometimes when performance is worse than expected. The expectancy 
disconfirmation model predicts that when expectations are merely met (rather than 
exceeded), satisfaction will be moderate, and should lead to moderate ratings. However, I 
demonstrate that meeting expectations in peer-to-peer sharing (versus commercial 
businesses) can lead to highly positive ratings for two reasons: 1) ratings are more 
important to peer providers than traditional providers, and 2) relatedly, consumers feel 
that they need to justify the ratings they give providers. This increases the importance of 
trust, and reduces the importance of satisfaction which is more subjective and thus more 
difficult to justify. Platforms that help consumers feel that their rating is less important to 
providers can partially attenuate the positive ratings bias (Study 3).  
 
The expectancy disconfirmation model predicts that when performance is worse than 
expected, consumers will be dissatisfied, and this should lead to low ratings. However, I 
show that negative disconfirmation in peer-to peer services can lead to positive ratings 
because gratitude and empathy encourage consumers to forgive peer providers when 
expectations are missed, especially when standards of evaluation are relatively unclear, as 
they often are in peer-to-peer services (Studies 4 and 5). Thus, platforms that set clear 
standards for peer-to-peer services can help to attenuate the positive ratings bias.  
 
Evaluations of trust include assessments of a provider’s reliability and integrity. 
Consumers may forgive peer providers for service that is unreliable, but missed 
expectations can lead to negative ratings if consumers infer that a provider’s performance 




question the provider’s integrity. With this in mind, in Study 6 I test a novel ratings 
system that can attenuate the positive ratings bias by asking providers to rate themselves 
on key attributes. Provider-authored ratings act as implicit commitments, and consumers 
should perceive that missed expectations based on those commitments are controllable. 
Thus, providers who rate themselves higher than their true performance level will be 
considered dishonest, and consumers should feel justified to assess them negatively. The 
conceptual models for the set of six studies are in Figure 1. 
 
2 Conceptual Development 
 
Peer-to-peer platforms need to address positive ratings bias, because accurate ratings are 
critical for establishing trust and preventing customer defection. Possible explanations for 
the bias include concern for managing one’s public image to other members of the 
sharing network (Mulshine, 2015), pressure to not harm a peer provider’s ability to earn 
income (Filippas et al., 2018), and socially induced reciprocity based on personal 
connections (Fradkin et al., 2015). Each of these may have merit, but none have been 
experimentally tested, nor positioned within a framework that explains how they affect 
the ratings decision process. I address this by exploring the differences in the expectancy 
disconfirmation process for peer-to-peer services, and how these differences contribute to 
biased ratings. In doing so, I suggest and test possible solutions for how sharing platforms 
can fix the problem. Next, I review the established literature to develop the propositions 










Panel B. Negative Disconfirmation and Positive Ratings Bias: Proposed Differential 









2.1 Product Quality and Electronic Word-of-Mouth  
 
Consumers often rely on opinions from other consumers to help them make purchase 
decisions. Word-of-mouth is valuable because it is considered to be less biased than 
commercial messages (Godes & Mayzlin, 2004; Hamilton et al., 2014). The Internet has 
greatly expanded word-of-mouth communication options (Dellarocas, 2003), including 
through descriptive product reviews, ratings, upvotes and downvotes, social media and 
discussion forums, and many others. Collectively, electronic word-of-mouth is defined as 
“any positive or negative statement made by potential, actual, or former customers about 
a product or company, which is made available to a multitude of people and institutions 
via the Internet” (Hennig-Thurau et al., 2004, p. 39).  
 
When making purchase decisions in online platforms, consumers place the most 
importance on the aggregate product rating (De Langhe et al., 2016). Aggregate ratings 
(i.e., the mean score for all of the individual ratings for a product) have been shown to 
drive online sales for products across many categories such as books (Chevalier & 
Mayzlin, 2006), toiletries (Moe & Trusov, 2011), and video games (Zhu & Zhang, 2010). 
This is because ratings are widely believed (by consumers and researchers alike) to be an 
important indicator of quality (Engler et al., 2015; Hu et al., 2017; Simonson & Rosen, 
2014). Indeed, aggregate ratings, which are often assessed on a 5-star scale, have a 
stronger influence on consumers’ quality inferences than other implicit online quality 
cues such as the number of ratings or the price of the product (De Langhe et al., 2016).  
 




correlate poorly with objective quality measures such as Consumer Reports scores (De 
Langhe et al., 2016). This may be due to biases in either the individual rating from an 
individual consumer, or in the aggregate distribution. For individual ratings, social 
influence and impression management concerns may cause a consumer to post a rating 
that is higher or lower than their true opinion. For example, negative opinions from other 
consumers (in the form of prior ratings) can cause a consumer to post a negative rating so 
that they don’t appear indiscriminate (Schlosser, 2005). Positive prior ratings can also 
influence ratings. A consumer that has a positive product experience may post a negative 
rating to affirm their distinctiveness, while a consumer that has a negative experience 
may post a positive rating because they feel pressure to conform to popular opinion 
(Sridhar & Srinivasan, 2012). These herding and differentiation effects are common in 
many product and service review platforms (Lee et al., 2015).  
 
The difference between ratings scores and objective quality may also be due to biases in 
the total distribution of ratings. Rather than a normal distribution, online ratings for most 
commercial products and services cluster in the extremes, with many positive ratings, a 
moderate amount of negative ratings, and very few neutral opinions. This “j-shaped” 
ratings distribution may be due to self-selection bias (Hu et al., 2017; Moe & Schweidel, 
2011). Consumers with extremely negative or extremely positive feelings about a product 
are much more likely to leave an online review. To understand this bias, we must 
consider consumers’ motivation for providing word-of-mouth, which is most often 





2.2 Expectancy Disconfirmation, Satisfaction, and Ratings 
 
The path from product experience to satisfaction to electronic word-of-mouth can be 
explicated through the well-established expectancy disconfirmation model (Oliver, 1980, 
2010). The model proposes that, prior to purchase, consumers form initial expectations 
about how the product or service will perform. These expectations may come from prior 
experience with the product or category, from claims made by the marketer, or from 
opinions expressed by other consumers (Woodruff et al., 1983). When a consumer 
experiences the product, they compare actual performance (i.e., perceived quality) with 
expected performance. If the product or service performs better than expected, positive 
disconfirmation occurs, and consumers are satisfied. If the product or service performs 
worse than expected, negative disconfirmation occurs, and consumers are dissatisfied.  
 
In the context of the dissertation, I take the view that satisfaction is a post-experience 
response to the evaluation of a specific purchase occasion (i.e., "transaction-specific” 
satisfaction; e.g., Halstead et al., 1994; Oliver, 1993; Spreng et al., 1996) which is the 
dominant view from the expectancy disconfirmation model. It is important to note that 
this view is different from “cumulative satisfaction” which is an overall evaluation based 
on a product’s past, current, and future performance, and which is often used in the 
service quality and relational exchange literatures (Anderson et al., 1994; Boulding et al., 
1993; Fornell, 1992). I measure transaction-specific satisfaction because most sharing 
economy consumers have no past history with their provider, and exchanges are likely to 





Transaction-specific satisfaction has been found to influence a variety of purchase-related 
outcomes including willingness-to-pay, repeat purchase, loyalty intentions, and word-of-
mouth (Agustin & Singh, 2005; Anderson & Sullivan, 1993; Eisenbeiss et al., 2014; 
Meuter et al., 2000). This research shows that if the satisfaction response to the 
expectancy disconfirmation evaluation is strong enough, it motivates consumers to take 
action (Anderson, 1998; Eisenbeiss et al., 2014). Specifically, satisfaction motivates 
word-of-mouth as a means to persuade others, or in the case of extreme dissatisfaction, as 
a way to vent or harm a provider (Berger, 2014).  
 
Posting online reviews and ratings takes effort, and often requires the consumer to attach 
their name (or username) to their review. Thus, many consumers choose not to leave a 
review (Avery et al., 1999). Consumers who experience moderate satisfaction are 
especially unlikely to expend the effort (Schoenmüller et al., 2018) because the 
satisfaction response is not strong enough to motivate action. Therefore, their moderate 
opinions are often not reflected in aggregate ratings. Thus, the difference between 
aggregate ratings and objective quality measures can partly be explained by self-selection 
bias that excludes many moderate opinions from the total distribution of ratings.  
 
The self-selection problem demonstrates that satisfaction and dissatisfaction influence not 
only whether a consumer decides to perform word-of-mouth (for example, posting an 
online rating), but also what the consumer posts, in terms of the rating itself. Highly 
satisfied consumers post highly positive ratings (5-stars), and highly dissatisfied 




punish providers. Recognizing this, some researchers have begun to model ratings not as 
an outcome of quality, but rather as an outcome of satisfaction (e.g., Engler et al., 2015; 
Moe & Schweidel, 2011). These models measure both product performance and initial 
expectations, or a comparison between the two (expectancy disconfirmation), and treat 
expectancy disconfirmation as a proxy for satisfaction. The models therefore make an 
implicit assumption that the full effect of expectancy disconfirmation on online ratings is 
mediated through feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. As we will see, this may not 
be accurate, especially for peer-to-peer services. 
 
Similar to commercial services, peer-to-peer platforms provide consumers with an 
opportunity to express electronic word-of-mouth. In fact, reviews and ratings from other 
consumers are especially important for peer-to-peer services because providers are 
unknown to consumers, and there are few other sources of online reputation or quality 
assurance. Like most commercial services, most peer-to-peer platforms use a 5-star 
ratings scale. But peer-to-peer ratings are skewed even more to the positive, and have 
even less variance than commercial ratings (Bolton et al., 2012; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 
2006). Rather than a “j-shaped” distribution, the ratings for peer-to-peer services are 
nearly all positive. In addition to the previous examples for Airbnb and Uber, 91% of 
oDesk services were rated at 4 or 5 stars (Horton & Golden, 2015), and 98% of 
BlaBlaCar trips were rated 5 stars (Slee, 2013).  
 
Can this extreme positive ratings distribution be explained by satisfaction and/or self-




Because satisfaction results from the evaluation of expectancy disconfirmation, 
satisfaction could explain the extreme positive skew in peer-to-peer ratings only if 
consumers of peer-to-peer services were significantly more likely to have their 
expectations exceeded than commercial consumers. This would result from either 
significantly higher perceived quality in peer-to-peer services, and/or significantly lower 
expectations. Peer-to-peer services are often delivered by non-professional providers. It is 
therefore unlikely that they will deliver better performance and higher quality than 
commercial providers on average. Further, the varying levels of commitment, experience, 
and expertise by peer providers makes peer provider quality more heterogenous than 
commercial services (Fradkin et al., 2015). Thus it is unlikely that quality is consistently 
high in peer-to-peer services. Expectations are also not likely to be the main driver of the 
positive bias in peer-to-peer ratings. Although there is some evidence that peer-to-peer 
consumers may have slightly lower expectations, this does not fully explain the ratings 
distribution (Fradkin, 2017). Indeed, consumers purchase the products and services that 
best balance the trade-off between costs and expected quality. On balance, the majority of 
consumers (both in commercial and peer-to-peer platforms) should have relatively high 
expectations and a positive initial disposition toward the product, or else they would not 





Table 1: Evaluation of Possible Causes for Consistently High Peer-to-Peer Ratings 
 
Observations Implications for Peer-to-Peer Experiences 
Implications for Peer-to-Peer 
Ratings 
   
Peer providers are mostly 
not professional 
The quality of peer providers 
is unlikely to be significantly 
higher than commercial 
providers 
Consistently high quality is not 
the cause of positive bias in 
peer-to-peer ratings 
There is high variance in 
peer providers’ experience, 
expertise, commitment, and 
quality of shared assets 
Peer providers’ quality is more 
heterogeneous than 
commercial providers 
Consistently high quality is not 
the cause of positive bias in 
peer-to-peer ratings 
In general, consumers 
choose products in which 
they have relatively high 
expectations 
Initial expectations are 
unlikely to be significantly 
lower in peer-to-peer services 
Consistently low expectations 
are not the cause of positive 
bias in peer-to-peer ratings 
Peer-to-peer platforms 
encourage a much higher 
rate of review than 
commercial sites 
 There is less self-selection bias 
in peer-to-peer ratings. 
Satisfaction is not the cause of 
positive bias in peer-to-peer 
ratings 
   
 
 
Can selection bias explain the positive ratings in peer-to-peer platforms? Because online 
reviews are the main source of reputation for peer-to-peer services, platforms encourage a 
much higher review rate than commercial businesses. For example, Fradkin (2017) 
estimates that the review rate for trips on Airbnb is 70%, compared to 2.5% for Expedia. 
If consumers who experienced moderate satisfaction are least likely to provide a review, 
then the significantly higher review rate for peer-to-peer services means that more 
consumers with moderate opinions are included in the peer-to-peer ratings distribution. 
This should result in less extreme ratings in peer-to-peer services, not more extreme. 




ratings. In sum, and as described in P1, I anticipate that a consumer’s evaluation of their 
service experience through expectancy disconfirmation, and their resultant satisfaction, 
does not affect peer-to-peer ratings in the same way as it does for commercial services. 
 
P1: Consumers rate their providers based on an evaluation of perceived quality 
compared to initial expectations. For commercial services, the satisfaction that 
results from this evaluation is the primary driver of ratings. In contrast, for peer-
to-peer services, expectancy disconfirmation evaluations affect ratings outside of 
satisfaction. 
 
2.3 Trust and its Impact on Peer-to-Peer Ratings 
 
I argue that expectancy disconfirmation may lead to trust, in addition to satisfaction. I 
further argue that contextual differences between peer-to-peer services and commercial 
services causes trust to have a stronger impact on peer-to-ratings than satisfaction, and 
causes consumers to rate peer-to-peer services positively even if expectations are merely 
met (vs. exceeded) or sometimes if they are negatively disconfirmed. See Table 2 for a 





Table 2: Contextual Differences Between Peer-to-Peer and Commercial Services 
 
Differences between Peer-to-Peer  
and Commercial Services  Reason for Differences 
  
Peer-to-peer services have more 
uncertainty in performance  
outcomes 
Peer providers are unknown to consumers. Heterogeneity 
in peer provider quality, and the lack of implicit quality 
signals make performance more difficult to predict. 
Peer-to-peer services have more 
perceived risk 
Peer providers are not professionals and can join platforms 
with limited vetting. Providers and consumers share private 
space together with limited oversight by the platform.   
Ratings are considered to be more 
important to peer providers 
Platforms match peer providers with potential customers in 
the membership network. Ratings are the primary driver of 
this matching. Platforms can encourage or prevent matches 
based on whether providers meet ratings thresholds. 
Peer-to-peer consumers feel a higher 
need to justify their ratings 
Peer providers pay close attention to ratings because of 
their importance. Consumers know that a low rating may 
make it difficult for the provider to acquire new business.  
Standards of evaluation are relatively 
unclear in peer-to-peer services 
Peer provider offerings are more heterogenous and not 
easily compared.  
Causality for missed expectations is 
more difficult to assess in peer-to-
peer services 
Standards of evaluation are relatively less clear. Consumers 
are unsure whether a non-professional provider should be 
held to the same standard as a commercial provider. 
Controllability for missed 
expectations is more difficult to 
assess in peer-to-peer services 
Peer providers are not professionals. They may not have 
the skills, experience, or resources to control performance 
issues in the same way as a commercial provider. 
Peer-to-peer consumers feel more 
gratitude and empathy toward their 
providers 
Peer-to-peer sharing is a blend of economic and social 
exchange. Providers and consumers who share space and 
personal items together may develop social connections. 
 
 
As previously discussed, consumers compare perceived quality against their initial 




comparisons: a comparison of perceived quality with desired quality (“desire 
congruency”), and a comparison of perceived quality with expected quality (“expectation 
congruency”). Expectation congruency indicates how close the match was between what 
the consumer expected and what the product delivered, regardless of how well it met the 
consumer’s desires. In other words, one may expect a product to perform relatively 
poorly, and if it did, it would be a match for expectation congruency (but not a match for 
desire congruency). Spreng et al. (1996) argue that expectation congruency leads to 
“information satisfaction”; a measure of how satisfied the consumer is with the claims 
given by the provider on which the consumer based their expectations. I argue that it can 
also lead to trust.  
 
The link between expectancy disconfirmation and trust has not been extensively theorized  
in extant research, although the relationship is somewhat implied in the various 
definitions of trust. I propose that trust in exchange relationships is directly related to 
whether a provider honours their promises and commitments. Delivering on 
commitments is so important that many researchers have incorporated this concept into 
the definition of trust. For example, Sirdeshmukh et al. (2002, p. 17) define trust as 
“expectations held by the consumer that the service provider is dependable and can be 
relied on to deliver on its promises.” Agustin and Singh (2005, p. 97) define trust as “a 
consumer’s confident beliefs that he or she can rely on the seller to deliver promised 
service.”  Embedded in these and other definitions of trust (e.g., Lewicki et al., 2006; 
Mayer et al., 1995; Robinson, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998) is the concept of expectations, 




of trust definitions and further theorizing that implicitly supports my argument for the 
link between expectancy disconfirmation and trust). By embedding the concept of 
expectations into the definition of trust, it implies that trust is built over time when 
expectations are continually confirmed (Zhang et al., 2020). Confirmed expectations lead 
to a confidence that exchange partners will deliver upon future commitments and 
expected positive outcomes. However, when promises are broken, and expectations are 
negatively disconfirmed, trust is lost (Lewicki et al., 2006; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). 
 
In the context of the dissertation, I use Morgan and Hunt’s definition of trust as 
“confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity” (1994, p. 23). Reliability 
suggests that past performance is a dependable predictor of future actions, while integrity 
means that exchange partners honor their commitments fairly and honestly (P. H. Kim et 
al., 2004). I argue that both reliability and integrity are related to meeting expectations. In 
the case of peer-to-peer exchange, consumer expectations for a peer provider are 
influenced by consumer reviews, and by information that the provider gives in their 
online profile and in direct communication with the consumer. When expectations are 
met (i.e., “confirmed expectations” in the vernacular of the expectancy disconfirmation 
model), it demonstrates that the provider is trustworthy. Specifically, reliability is 
demonstrated if prior performance (as documented in the consumer reviews) has been 
repeated, thereby confirming expectations. Integrity is demonstrated if a provider keeps 
the promises they made in their online profile and in direct communication, again 



















































Although the link between expectancy disconfirmation and trust may be implied in many 
definitions of trust, the authors do not test this argument. However, Darke, Ashworth and 
Main (2010) test the relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and trust in the 
context of misleading advertising claims. They find that when consumers experience 
negative disconfirmation (operationalized as product performance that is worse than the 
advertised claims), consumers experience distrust. They also find that negative 
disconfirmation has a relatively stronger effect on trust than positive disconfirmation (i.e., 
when product performance is better than advertised claims). These results suggest that 
there is an opportunity to further establish the relationship between expectancy 
disconfirmation and trust in consumer research. Specifically, I will explore which factors 
strengthen the relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and trust, and 
subsequently, which factors affect the relationship between trust and word-of-mouth.  
 
I propose that uncertainty and perceived risk are two important moderators in these 
relationships. Both factors are necessary for the development of trust (Bhattacharya et al., 
1998), and both may be higher in peer-to-peer services than comparable commercial 
services. Uncertainty is the degree to which it is difficult to predict what will happen in a 
consumption experience, which often leads to a feeling of discomfort (Sun et al., 2012). 
Uncertainty is caused by a lack of knowledge about potential outcomes or by perceived 
variance in outcomes (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). In the sharing economy, consumers transact 
with providers with whom they have no personal history. The providers may not have the 
skill to satisfy the consumer’s needs, and their motives may be unclear (Belk, 2013). This 




offerings and quality contributes to perceived outcome variance. 
 
When uncertainty is high, it provides the opportunity for exchange partners to 
demonstrate their trustworthiness (Molm et al., 2000). If outcomes are certain, then 
actions can be taken without the need for trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Outcomes are 
rarely certain in practice, but even relative certainty can limit the impact of expectancy 
disconfirmation on trust. For example, imagine that a consumer decides to purchase a 
piece of meat from a butcher. The butcher has several locations around the city and has a 
very good reputation through consumer and expert reviews. The consumer has visited the 
butcher periodically in the past, and the product has consistently been good. If the 
consumer receives a good piece of meat on their next trip, and their positive expectations 
are confirmed, it should not drastically affect their perceptions of trust. The consumer 
already had trust in this butcher. If the consumer receives a bad piece of meat, they may 
be dissatisfied, but they likely won’t question the butcher’s trustworthiness. The butcher 
has demonstrated consistent quality in the past, and trust has been built over time.  
 
On the other hand, imagine that a new butcher has moved into the neighbourhood. The 
consumer would like to try the new butcher, but they are uncertain if the butcher is better 
than their usual provider. The new butcher advertises “Top quality meat at fair prices”. 
The consumer wonders if the quality will match the advertising. If the consumer receives 
a good piece of meat, it provides evidence that the butcher and their advertising can be 
trusted. If the consumer receives a bad piece of meat, they may question the provider’s 




consumers search for information before committing to a transaction (Grant & Tybout, 
2008). Often, consumers must rely on the service provider for this information (Singh & 
Sirdeshmukh, 2000). When relying on provider claims, consumers are attuned to 
evaluating whether performance meets commitments. If commitments are met, and the 
consumer’s expectations are confirmed, the provider’s trustworthiness is demonstrated. 
Thus: 
P2: If a consumer is relatively uncertain that a provider is able and willing to 
deliver positive outcomes as expected, the provider’s fulfillment of those 
expectations has a stronger impact on the consumer’s perceptions of trust than if 
they were relatively certain about outcomes. 
 
Peer-to-peer services also carry higher perceived risk. Providers are numerous and 
unknown to consumers, and can join a sharing platform with limited vetting. Thus the 
risk of opportunism may be higher than for commercial services. Initial meetings between 
consumers and peer providers take place online where trust is difficult to establish 
(Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002). When exchanges move offline, they often lead to close 
personal interactions in private homes or vehicles, such as when an Airbnb consumer 
shares a home with the owner. The platforms have little control and oversight over these 
transactions as they are ongoing. This contributes to performance risk, safety risk, and 
property risk (Gullstrand Edbring et al., 2016; Schor, 2014).  
 
Trust is related to risk because trust requires a willingness by exchange partners to make 
themselves vulnerable (Mayer et al., 1995). Vulnerability implies that if exchange 
partners act opportunistically, the consequences will be relatively severe (Chopra & 




provider trustworthiness becomes more important. Consumers are primarily concerned 
that providers deliver on expectations, and that there are no surprises. For example, 
bungee jumping is a service experience with a very high risk, and consumers would want 
to ensure that their provider is completely trustworthy. Similarly, for peer-to-peer 
services, which carry a higher risk, it is important for consumers to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of their provider. In the absence of prior history with a provider, 
reputation serves as an antecedent to trust (Smith & Barclay, 1997) because it can signal 
that providers have performed without opportunism in previous exchanges (Cheema, 
2008). For peer-to-peer services, ratings and reviews act as digital reputation. A 
consumer’s evaluation of their trust in the provider should carry forward to the rating, as 
a signal to other consumers that this is a provider that can be trusted to honour their 
commitments. Thus: 
 
P3: If an exchange carries a relatively high perceived risk, the provider’s 
trustworthiness is an important performance attribute which should be reflected in 
their rating.  
 
P4: Peer-to-peer services ratings will reflect the consumer’s trust in the peer 
provider, in addition to the consumer’s satisfaction with the experience. 
 
The proposed link from trust to word-of-mouth is novel. Much more established is the 
link from word-of-mouth to trust. Electronic word-of-mouth (including online ratings and 
reviews) helps consumers to feel that a seller can be trusted. Indeed, the aggregate 
numerical rating, ratings valence, positive and negative framing of reviews, and quantity 




lead to purchase intention, willingness-to-pay, and loyalty (Awad & Ragowsky, 2008; Ba 
& Pavlou, 2002; Casado-Aranda et al., 2019; Sparks & Browning, 2011; Utz et al., 
2012).  However, there is little research demonstrating a direct relationship from trust to 
word-of-mouth. My literature review finds three studies that show a positive relationship 
from trust to self-reported word-of-mouth. The contexts for the studies were telephone 
services (Ranaweera & Prabhu, 2003), banking and dentistry (Gremler et al., 2001), and 
supermarkets in Greece (Vlachos et al., 2011). These studies do not identify moderators 
for this relationship (such as perceived risk), nor do they measure the effect of trust on 
actual word-of-mouth behavior, which is a novel aspect of my dissertation.  
 
Importantly, I believe that establishing trust as an outcome of expectancy 
disconfirmation, and establishing how trust affects ratings, should not be limited to peer-
to-peer contexts. However, I believe that the peer-to-peer context is the right place to 
begin exploring the role and impact of trust because of the high risk and uncertainty (as 
previously discussed) and because of contextual factors that strengthen the influence of 
trust and lead to biased ratings, which I will explain next.  
 
2.4 Confirmed Expectations and Positive Ratings Bias 
 
To determine how evaluations of trust contribute to the positive ratings bias in peer-to-
peer services, we return to our anecdote about Dave’s experience with Airbnb: 
 




reviews and looking through the pictures in the online listing. The experience was pretty 
much as he expected. There were no surprises; the accommodation was as it was 
advertised in the listing. It was a smallish room in an older house that was in a nice quiet 
neighbourhood. After the stay, Dave receives an email from Airbnb asking him to rate the 
experience. He is unsure what to do. The room was comfortable, but it wasn’t 
particularly inspiring. He had hoped that maybe it would have been a bit nicer, but it did 
its job. Mary seemed nice. She was a good host and Dave doesn’t want to give a lower 
rating that would make it harder for her to find new guests.  
 
When a consumer evaluates performance against expectations, there are three possible 
outcomes. First, expectations may be confirmed, when performance merely meets 
expectations or falls within a “zone of indifference” where performance is close enough 
to expectations to not trigger disconfirmation (Woodruff et al., 1983). However, if 
expectations are disconfirmed, it is because performance was either better (positive 
disconfirmation) or worse than expected (negative disconfirmation). It is informative to 
review each of these situations and to compare their effect on ratings in commercial and 
peer-to-peer services. This allows us to begin to understand why peer-to-peer ratings have 
































































First, for commercial services, if performance exceeds expectations, the expectancy 
disconfirmation model suggests that it should result in a highly satisfactory experience 
with feelings of delight (Homburg et al., 2005). These high arousal emotions increase in 
intensity the further that performance exceeds expectation (Eisenbeiss et al., 2014), and 
lead to a desire to reward the provider with word-of-mouth (Anderson, 1998). The result 
is highly positive ratings. Similarly, for peer-to-peer services, if a provider exceeds 
expectations it should result in highly positive ratings. A provider that goes beyond their 
promised or contractual obligations signals that they care about the consumer 
(Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002). The provider’s benevolence leads to high levels of trust 
(Blois, 1999), and consumers should feel a desire to reward that trust. 
 
On the other hand, when expectations are merely met (i.e., confirmed), which occurs in 
the majority of cases for commercial providers (Woodruff et al., 1983), it does not trigger 
strong feelings of satisfaction and does not ignite a desire for word-of-mouth (Anderson, 
1998). Self-selection leads to an underreporting bias; only consumers with extreme 
evaluations make the effort to post an online review (Schoenmüller et al., 2018). If 
commercial businesses could fix the underreporting bias, then the majority of ratings 
would be moderate, matching the prevalence of expectancy confirmation. This was 
experimentally demonstrated by Hu et al. (2017) who found that when commercial 
ratings were captured by all consumers, approximately 90% of the ratings were moderate 





In contrast, when expectations are merely met in peer-to-peer services, it may lead to 
positive ratings (4 or 5 stars) through trust. There are two main reasons. First, even if 
expectations are merely met (rather than exceeded), trust may be relatively high. To 
demonstrate trustworthiness, consumers hold providers accountable for delivering on 
their promises; providers are not required to go above and beyond to meet a consumer’s 
individual needs. Thus, when expectations are merely met, ratings that are related to trust 
should be higher than ratings that are related to satisfaction, because satisfaction is 
moderate when expectations are merely met.  
 
P5: When expectations are confirmed, trust will be higher than satisfaction. 
 
Second, network effects that are unique to peer-to-peer services decrease the importance 
of satisfaction (relative to trust) on ratings, and further compel consumers to increase 
their ratings. Peer-to-peer transactions are usually contained within a platform’s network. 
Peer providers have limited resources to promote their business outside of this network 
(Benoit et al., 2017), and the reputation system is their primary means of differentiation 
and customer procurement. Platforms such as Airbnb use ratings to promote better 
providers, and can punish providers who fall below a ratings threshold, which jeopardizes 
their business (Jenkins, 2018). Thus, consumers should feel that ratings are more 
important to peer providers compared to commercial providers. Consumers may feel 
pressure not to harm a provider for a moderately satisfying experience, as long as the 
provider put forth a reasonable effort (i.e., as long as they were trustworthy). This leads to 





Most peer-to-peer platforms also have a two-sided rating system in which both the 
consumer and provider are rated. Both the consumer and provider must agree to an 
exchange, and the ratings and reviews are the primary basis on which exchange decisions 
are made. Because ratings are so important, peer providers monitor them closely. 
Consumers may be afraid that if they give a low rating, the provider will react with 
negative public feedback on the platform or negative private feedback to other network 
providers. This is worrisome, because consumers want to be seen as a fair exchange 
partner so that they will be able to attract future providers (Mulshine, 2015).  
 
The relative importance of ratings and the fear of retribution from providers causes peer-
to-peer consumers to feel that they may need to justify their ratings decisions. In turn, this 
causes the effect of satisfaction on ratings to be reduced. Satisfaction is concerned with 
needs fulfillment, which is somewhat subjective to an individual’s unique needs and 
tastes, and so may be more difficult to justify. Satisfaction is also an emotional response 
(Oliver, 2010), rather than being based solely on cognitive judgements and hard facts. 
When consumers feel a need to justify, they tend to rely on reason-based rather than 
feeling-based decision making (Hong & Chang, 2015). One of the easier reasons to 
evaluate is whether the provider met their promised commitments and is trustworthy. If 
an Airbnb provider met their commitments, but the consumer was dissatisfied because the 
accommodation simply wasn’t luxurious enough for their individual taste, it would be 
difficult to justify a low rating. The provider fulfilled their promises and therefore “did 
nothing wrong”. In combination, the network effects of ratings importance and need to 





P6a: Because satisfaction is relatively subjective, the effect of satisfaction on 
ratings will be reduced when consumers feel that ratings are very important to 
peer providers and when they have a strong need to justify their ratings.  
 
P6b: When ratings are considered to be very important to their providers, 
consumers will post higher ratings for their provider than they post when ratings 
are considered less important. 
 
 
2.5 Negative Disconfirmation and Positive Ratings Bias 
 
2.5.1 The Effect of Provider Causality on Trust 
 
Figure 1, Panel B, illustrates the effect of negative disconfirmation on ratings. Negative 
disconfirmation occurs when performance is worse than expected. This should result in 
low satisfaction, trust, and ratings. However, as we will see, negative disconfirmation 
may result in high peer-to-peer ratings in some cases. Returning to our anecdote, let’s 
imagine that Dave’s experience with Airbnb did not go as well as he had expected: 
 
Dave decided to use Airbnb. He booked a room with Mary after reading the consumer 
reviews and looking through the pictures in the online listing. However, the experience 
was not as good as he expected. The room was smaller and the home was older than it 
looked in the pictures. There was paint peeling from some of the walls, and the furniture 
was in need of an update. There was also no coffeemaker, which was usually a deal 




missed that. After the stay, Dave receives an email from Airbnb asking him to rate the 
experience. He is unsure what to do. The experience was not great, but Mary seemed 
nice. The home was clean and Mary did everything she could. He would feel bad rating 
her poorly for things (like the room size) that were not under her control. 
 
If a commercial service fails to meet a consumer’s expectations, it causes dissatisfaction 
(Oliver, 2010). Compared to positive disconfirmation, “negative experiences are thought 
to be more salient, are perceived with greater intensity, and are expressed with a greater 
variety” (Oliver, 1993, p. 422). Dissatisfied consumers engage in more word-of-mouth 
than satisfied consumers (Anderson, 1998), and give more extreme evaluations 
(Eisenbeiss et al., 2014). This is because expectations act as a reference point against 
which consumers can evaluate performance (Homburg et al., 2005). Performance above 
the reference point is evaluated as a gain, while performance below expectations is a loss. 
Because losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), negative 
disconfirmation leads to stronger dissatisfaction (Mittal et al., 1998).  
 
The fact that expectations are a reference point also explains why consumers do not feel a 
strong satisfaction response when performance merely meets expectations. However, 
when expectations are negatively disconfirmed, it triggers a search for attribution (Oliver, 
2010). Consumers want to know what caused the missed expectations. Attribution theory 
explains how attributions are made (Heider, 1958); individuals evaluate causality and 
controllability before assigning blame (Weiner, 1985). Locus of causality refers to 




consumers can attribute missed expectations internally to their own error in expectation-
setting or product selection, or externally to the provider (Folkes, 1988). Controllability 
refers to volition. Was the performance failure controllable (and therefore preventable) or 
was it out of the control of the provider? Consumers engage in negative word-of-mouth 
when poor performance is deemed to be caused by and controlled by the provider. This 
generates anger and a desire to punish (Curren & Folkes, 1987).  
 
I propose that locus of causality and controllability moderate the relationship between 
negative disconfirmation and the two dimensions of trust: reliability and integrity. When 
consumers experience missed expectations, they first seek to determine causality. If the 
cause is determined to reside with the provider (as it often does), then the provider is 
unreliable because they did not demonstrate an ability to reliably deliver performance at a 
level that meets the consumer’s needs. However, causality may be more difficult to assess 
for peer-to-peer services. To determine causality of a missed expectation, consumers may 
consider whether their expectations were fair. Fairness of expectations can be evaluated 
by comparing them against an industry standard, which establish the performance level 
that the provider should have been able to deliver (Woodruff et al., 1983). Consumers 
generally have a good understanding of commercial standards, but they may be less clear 
about what standard to expect from a peer provider (Tussyadiah, 2016). For example, the 
hotel industry has well-established standards for attributes such as cleanliness and 
privacy. Consumers can form reasonable expectations for a budget, mid-range or luxury 
hotel. If performance fails to meet these competitive standards, a consumer can easily 




However, for peer-to-peer rentals on platforms like Airbnb, the types of accommodations 
are more varied. It could be a shared room with another guest, a private room in a shared 
home with the owner, or a full-home rental. The home may be the provider’s personal 
residence, or it may be a separate property used for rentals only. It may be located in an 
apartment building, or in a detached home, or in the basement of a home, or in a castle, or 
in a treehouse (see Appendix B for examples of Airbnb accommodations). There may be 
differences in which rooms can be accessed during the rental, and what appliances are on-
site. How can consumers easily and fairly compare one accommodation against another? 
When a provider invites guests into their home to share space with them, what level of 
service should be expected? With hotels, consumers clearly expect a spotlessly clean 
room. But should an Airbnb provider be expected to deliver hotel-level cleanliness in a 
home that they live in with their family? How harshly should the provider be judged?  
 
When standards are less clear, consumers have difficulty assessing causality. Was the 
cause of negative disconfirmation due to poor performance or to expectations that were 
set too high or otherwise inaccurate? If a consumer is unclear on the standard that should 
be expected from a peer provider, how can they make a definitive determination that the 
provider has failed? The consumer may fault themselves for not being able to clearly set 
expectations, failing to properly assess the online listing, failing to ask the correct 
questions, and so on. The provider may therefore not be deemed unreliable.  
 
P7: If a consumer is not certain that a provider caused a performance failure, then 
the effect of negative disconfirmation on perceptions of provider reliability is 




2.5.2 The Effect of Provider Control on Trust 
 
Attributions of causality affect perceptions of reliability, but even if a provider was the 
cause of negative disconfirmation, it does not necessarily mean that the provider lacks 
integrity. I propose that controllability is an important factor in the determination of 
integrity, and that controllability may be more difficult to assess for peer-to-peer services. 
If a peer provider’s service is worse than expected, but not egregiously low, consumers 
may consider the issues uncontrollable. This is because peer providers are not 
professionals, and may not have the aptitude, knowledge, or financial resources to fix 
negative issues. For example, an Airbnb provider may rent out a home in a less-than-ideal 
location, or a home that shows the wear and tear of several years of family use. The 
consumer may recognize that the issues with the home are the cause of their negative 
experience, but feel that the issues were not controllable. An Airbnb provider cannot 
change the age or location of their family home in the same way that a hotel provider 
would be expected to renovate its rooms when they become outdated. If negative 
disconfirmation is caused by the provider, but not under their control, the provider is 
unreliable, but not without integrity. The provider put forth a good faith effort, but did not 
have the ability to deliver expected quality. 
 
On the other hand, if a consumer infers that a provider had control over the negative 
outcome, they may question the provider’s integrity. For example, if an Airbnb provider 
misrepresents their home in the online listing, or fails to alert the consumer about an 
important appliance that is no longer functioning, then the missed expectations were 




the consumer should hold the provider responsible for their actions (Oliver, 2010; 
Weiner, 1995). The consumer may determine that the provider lacks integrity because 
they attempted to deceive, and did not demonstrate a desire to fairly honour their 
commitments.  
 
P8: If a consumer is not certain that a provider had control over a performance 
failure, then the effect of negative disconfirmation on perceptions of provider 
integrity is weakened.   
 
2.5.3 The Role of Social Norms Biases on Trust and Ratings 
 
Peer-to-peer sharing blends economic with social exchange (Sundararajan, 2019). 
Although most peer-to-peer services are paid, providers are usually not professionals, and 
they invite consumers into their homes or share access to personal property. Further, 
providers and consumers often share space together which fosters social relationships 
(Celata et al., 2017). This mix of social and economic exchange may contribute to the 
positive ratings bias in peer-to-peer services. For example, Fradkin and colleagues (2015) 
suggest that consumers may give higher ratings to providers through reciprocity brought 
on by feelings of social connectedness. However, this proposition was not directly tested, 
and there is an opportunity to further explore the mechanism of the potential effect.  
 
I propose that the blend of social and economic exchange in peer-to-peer services leads 
consumers to feel gratitude and empathy toward their provider. In turn, these positive 
emotions generate a desire to forgive peer providers for unreliable service. Consumers 




into the provider’s personal space (Ikkala & Lampinen, 2015; Stofberg et al., 2019). 
Social norms generate a desire to repay this hospitality. In social exchanges, benefits are 
given based on need, and without expectation of reciprocation (Clark & Mills, 2011). 
However, reciprocations made out of gratitude are appreciated (Aggarwal, 2004). In the 
case of peer services, gratitude can be expressed by giving a positive rating to forgive 
unreliable providers for issues that were out of their control. Consumers of peer-to-peer 
services may also feel empathy toward providers because they are not professionals and 
they are relatively independent from the platform (Costello & Reczek, 2020). This causes 
consumers to think about the consequences of their actions toward the provider rather 
than to the platform. Recognizing the importance of ratings to providers, consumers may 
not want to harm a peer provider with a low evaluation (Filippas et al., 2018).  
 
In summary, I propose that gratitude and empathy weaken the effect on unreliability on 
ratings. On the other hand, if consumers infer that a provider lacks integrity, the 
moderating effects of gratitude and empathy should be diminished. This is because the 
provider prioritized their own self-interests over attempting to meet the consumer’s 
needs. The social exchange relationship has been broken, and social norms are no longer 
applicable. Individuals tend to weigh negative information about integrity more strongly 
than negative information about reliability (Kim et al., 2004). Thus, rather than forgiving 
the provider, consumers may instead have a desire to punish them with a negative online 
rating as a signal that the provider cannot be trusted. 
 
P9a: When gratitude and empathy are high, consumers will post higher ratings for 





P9b: Gratitude and empathy will cause consumers to forgive a provider for 
unreliable service, but not if the provider is deemed to lack integrity. Thus, when 
negative disconfirmation occurs, gratitude and empathy weaken the effect of 
reliability on ratings but not the effect of integrity on ratings. 
 
In summary, I propose that peer-to-peer services are evaluated based on a consumer’s 
trust in the provider, in addition to their satisfaction with the experience. Trust 
assessments are based on whether a provider meets expectations, and are affected by 
uncertainty and risk. Network effects (ratings importance and need to justify ratings) and 
social norms (gratitude and empathy) may cause consumers to give positive ratings to 
peer providers even if performance merely meets expectations, or sometimes, even if 
performance is worse than expected. Indeed, I propose that consumers may give low 
ratings only when they believe that a provider lacks integrity by not attempting to 
conduct a fair transaction. In the next section, I describe the research studies that were 
designed to test these propositions (Studies 1-5). Finally, in Study 6, I examine a new 
system of evaluation that I think can improve on the problems documented in the other 
studies. Specifically, I propose and test a novel ratings system to attenuate the positivity 




Chapter 2  
 
3 The Current Research 
 
The positive bias in peer-to-peer ratings is an important problem for platforms, and one 
that has not been sufficiently explored or explained. I propose that the high risk and 
uncertainty in peer-to-peer exchanges leads consumers to evaluate and rate their 
experiences based on their trust in the peer provider in addition to their satisfaction with 
the provider’s performance. Contextual factors in the peer-to-peer sharing economy 
change how trust and satisfaction affect ratings, such that ratings may be positive when a 
consumer’s expectations are merely met (rather than exceeded) or even if performance is 
worse than expected. These propositions will be tested in Studies 1 through 6. However, I 
first conducted a Pretest Study to confirm my assumptions about the important contextual 
differences between peer-to-peer and commercial services, before testing how these 
differences affect trust, satisfaction and ratings in the main studies.  
  
4 Pretest Study 
 
The Pretest Study was designed to compare peer-to-peer and commercial services across 
a variety of contextual factors that could affect how service experiences are evaluated, 
and how evaluations affect the online rating. Specifically, the tested contextual 







4.1.1 Participants & Design 
 
Two hundred and four North American participants were recruited via the Prolific online 
research panel. Participants were asked if they had purchased peer-to-peer services in the 
categories of short-term accommodation rental (e.g., Airbnb) or ride services (e.g., Uber) 
in the past year and to answer questions about their most recent purchase. If participants 
did not have any peer-to-peer service experience in the past year, they were asked to 
recall and answer questions about their most recent service experience with a commercial 
business provider in one of those same categories (hotels and taxis). Twelve participants 
(5.9%) did not purchase either peer-to-peer or commercial services in either of the target 
categories in the past year, and were excluded from the study. The final sample included 
192 participants (92 women; Mage = 39.0 years) of which 110 recalled a recent peer-to-




Participants responded to questions concerning their feelings about their most recent 
peer-to-peer or commercial service experience. All items were measured on seven-point 
scales unless otherwise noted. First, participants were asked to think about how they felt 
when they were booking or about to begin their experience, including their expectations 
(“How high were your expectations for the level of quality and service that you would 




(“How risky did you feel that it was to use that provider?;” 1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely). 
Uncertainty was a two-item measure (“How certain were you about the level of quality 
and service that you would receive?,” “How confident were you that the provider would 
deliver the quality and service that you expected;” 1 = Not at all, 7 = Completely; 
reverse-coded; α = .74). Uncertainty and perceived risk are theoretically distinct, but 
closely-related constructs. Uncertainty is concerned with the fact that outcomes may be 
difficult to predict, and is based on perceived outcome variance or a lack of knowledge. 
These uncertain outcomes may be positive or negative, but the feeling of uncertainty is 
uncomfortable and something that consumers wish to avoid. Risk is concerned with the 
perceived likelihood of a negative outcome, and the potential severity of that outcome. 
Risk goes beyond performance risk, and could include safety risks, social risks, etc. To 
confirm the distinctiveness of these two constructs, I performed a correlation analysis and 
found that the two measures were only moderately correlated (r = .33, p < .01). 
 
Next, participants responded to questions about their feelings toward the experience 
itself. This included satisfaction (“How satisfied were you with your experience;” 
1=Very Dissatisfied, 7=Very Satisfied) and expectancy disconfirmation (“How did the 
experience compare to your prior expectations”), which was measured from “1 = much 
worse than I expected” to “7 = much better than I expected” (the midpoint “about the 
same as I expected” represented confirmed expectations). This operationalization follows 
the most common form of the scale (Oliver, 2010) and is well-established in satisfaction 
research (e.g. Patterson, Johnson, & Spreng, 1996; Tsiros, Mittal, & Ross Jr, 2004). The 




(i.e., a rating of 4 on the 7-point Expectancy Disconfirmation scale; 0 = No, 1 = Yes), 
positive disconfirmation (i.e., a rating of 5, 6, or 7 on the 7-point scale; 0 = No, 1 = Yes), 
or negative disconfirmation (i.e., a rating of 1, 2, or 3; 0 = No, 1 = Yes).  
 
Participants who experienced negative disconfirmation were asked a series of questions 
to indicate whether the missed expectations were more a result of their own unrealistic 
expectations, or whether the missed expectations were caused by the provider. 
Specifically, provider causality was a four-item measure (α = .73) that was rated on a 
seven-point semantic differential scale: (“My personal expectations were too high for this 
type of service/The provider’s quality or service level was too low for this type of 
service,” “My personal expectations for the service were not accurate/The provider’s 
description of the service was not accurate,” “I must have missed some important 
information in the service description/The service description must have been missing 
some important information,” “The missed expectations were completely my fault/ The 
missed expectations were completely the provider’s fault”). Participants were also asked 
to assess controllability for missed expectations. Provider control was a three-item 
measure (α = .94; “My poor experience was definitely controllable by my provider,” “My 
poor experience was definitely preventable by my provider,” “My poor experience was 
definitely avoidable by my provider;” 1= Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). 
 
Participants next responded to measures designed to understand how consumers of peer-
to-peer and commercial services make ratings choices. Provided rating was a binary 




was a measure of the actual rating that was given (from 1 star to 5 stars). This measure 
was then converted into a binary variable called five-star rating which took the value 1 if 
the rating was exactly 5-stars, and 0 otherwise. I created the five-star rating variable to 
determine the percentage of ratings that were five-stars, which provides some context for 
the extremity of the positive distribution. Ratings importance was a three-item measure 
(α = .80) of how important are ratings to the provider (“Online ratings from individual 
consumers are extremely important to the service provider,” “The provider monitors their 
online ratings extremely closely,” “Online ratings from individual consumers will greatly 
affect the provider’s future business;” 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). Need 
to justify was a five-item measure (α = .75) of whether consumers felt a need to justify 
ratings choices to the provider (“If I leave a poor rating, then I might have to justify my 
ratings choice,” “If I leave a poor rating, then I might have to explain my ratings choice,” 
“If I leave a poor rating, then I might be criticized by the provider,” “If I leave a poor 
rating, then I might be punished by the provider,” “If I leave a poor rating, then other 
providers might not want to service me;” 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). 
 
The next set of questions measured what makes a peer-to-peer or commercial service 
worthy of a five-star rating for the attributes of overall quality (quality 5-star; 1 = As long 
as the quality was adequate and there were no major issues during the experience then it 
deserves a 5-star rating, 7 = The quality and service must be exceptional in every way to 
deserve a 5-star rating), condition of the rental asset (condition 5-star; 1 = As long as the 
provider is honest in their description of the [home/vehicle]’s condition even if it is worn 




must look and work like it is brand new in order to deserve a 5-star rating), cleanliness 
(cleanliness 5-star; 1 = As long as the [home/vehicle] is relatively clean then it deserves a 
5-star rating, 7 = The [home/vehicle] must be spotlessly clean to deserve a 5-star rating), 
responsiveness of the provider (responsive 5-star; 1 = As long as the provider responds to 
any major concerns in a reasonable amount of time and makes some effort to try to fix 
them then they deserve a 5-star rating, 7 = The provider must respond immediately and 
fix all of my concerns in order to deserve a 5-star rating), and friendliness of the provider 
(friendly 5-star; 1 = As long as the provider isn’t rude then they deserve a 5-star rating, 7 
= The provider must be exceptionally friendly to deserve a 5-star rating).  
 
Next, participants indicated whether they were clear on the standards of expectation 
(clarity of standards; “How clear are you about what are the standards of quality and 
service that you should expect from a [X] service?;” 1 = Not at All, 7 = Completely). 
Finally, participants indicated their gratitude and empathy toward the provider (i.e., social 
norms) which was a six-item measure (α = .90) adapted from established scales (S. Lee et 
al., 2014; Morales, 2005). Participants were asked “When thinking about your service 
experience, to what extent did you feel the following emotions?”: grateful, appreciative, 




The Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix for the Pretest Study are in Appendix C. 




used to compare how consumers of peer-to-peer and commercial services evaluate their 
experiences. This comparison was performed at the overall level, and also within the 
specific service categories. As expected, there was no difference in the overall level of 
expectations for consumers of peer-to-peer and commercial services (MPeer = 4.55, 
MCommercial = 4.46, F(1, 190) = .25, p = .62). Also as expected, perceived risk was higher 
for peer-to-peer services (MPeer = 2.92, MCommercial = 2.37, F(1, 190) = 5.88, p < .05). This 
difference was driven by ride services (MPeer = 2.87, MCommercial = 2.22, F(1, 111) = 5.41, 
p < .05). However, uncertainty did not significantly differ between peer-to-peer and 
commercial services (MPeer = 3.03, MCommercial = 2.82, F(1, 190) = 1.47, p = .23). 
 
Satisfaction was higher for peer-to-peer services (MPeer = 5.94, MCommercial = 5.51, F(1, 
190) = 4.07, p < .05), but it did not significantly differ between peer-to-peer and 
commercial services for either accommodation or ride services individually. Expectancy 
disconfirmation was higher for peer-to-peer (M = 4.77) compared to commercial services 
(M = 4.26, F(1, 190) = 7.11, p < .05). This difference was significant for ride services 
(MPeer = 4.74, MCommercial = 4.22, F(1, 111) = 4.98, p < .05). The proportion of consumers 
who had their expectations merely met did not differ between peer-to-peer (42%) and 
commercial services (48%; β = -.23, SE = .29 p = .43). However, consumers of peer-to-
peer services were significantly more likely to experience positive disconfirmation (48% 
vs. 33%; β = .64, SE = .30, p < .05) and marginally less likely to experience negative 
disconfirmation (10% vs. 20%; β = -.78, SE = .42, p < .10). Unexpectedly, provider 
causality (MPeer = 4.73, MCommercial = 4.63, F(1, 25) = .05, p = .83) and provider control 




























As expected, consumers of peer-to-peer services were significantly more likely to provide 
an online rating after their service experience (β = 2.47, SE = .36, p < .01). Overall, 71% 
of peer-to-peer experiences were rated but only 17% of commercial experiences were 
rated. This difference was significant for both accommodation (76% vs. 16%) and ride 
services (68% vs. 18%). Also as expected, the average rating for peer-to-peer services (M 
= 4.60) was significantly higher than for commercial services (M = 3.93, F(1, 90) = 7.12, 
p < .05). This overall difference was driven by the ride services category (MPeer = 4.74, 
MCommercial = 3.88, F(1, 52) = 8.34, p < .05). Five-star ratings (which represent the 
extreme positive end of the ratings scale) were also significantly more likely for peer-to-
peer services (β = 1.59, SE = .61, p < .05). Overall, 73% of peer-to-peer ratings were 
five-stars, compared to only 36% of commercial ratings. This difference was again driven 
by the ride services category with 83% five-star ratings for peer-to-peer and only 25% 
five-star ratings for commercial ride services.  
 
As expected, when making a ratings decision, consumers of peer-to-peer (vs. 
commercial) services believe that the rating is more important to their provider (i.e., 
ratings importance; MPeer = 5.93, MCommercial = 5.22, F(1, 190) = 24.76, p < .01), and they 
feel marginally more strongly that they may need to justify the rating to the provider 
(MPeer = 4.29, MCommercial = 3.97, F(1, 190) = 3.19, p < .10). Ratings importance is higher 
for peer-to-peer in both the accommodation (MPeer = 6.30, MCommercial = 5.30, F(1, 77) = 
22.79, p < .01) and ride services category (MPeer = 5.71, MCommercial = 5.15, F(1, 111) = 
8.57, p < .01), while need to justify ratings is significantly higher only in the 





When evaluating whether their service experience deserves a five-star rating, consumers 
of commercial services hold providers to significantly higher standards for quality (MPeer 
= 3.78, MCommercial = 4.62, F(1, 190) = 9.40, p < .01) and for the condition of the rental 
asset (i.e., home or vehicle; MPeer = 3.76, MCommercial = 4.55, F(1, 190) = 7.81, p < .05). 
However, the five-star ratings standards for cleanliness (MPeer = 4.72, MCommercial = 5.04, 
F(1, 190) = 1.41, p = .24), responsiveness (MPeer = 4.38, MCommercial = 4.95, F(1, 77) = 
1.86, p = .18) and friendliness (MPeer = 4.04, MCommercial = 4.16, F(1, 111) = .09, p = .77) 
did not differ between peer-to-peer and commercial services. Next, I expected that the 
standards against which consumers evaluate services would be less clear for peer-to-peer, 
but there was no difference (i.e., clarity of standards; MPeer = 4.92 MCommercial = 4.77, F(1, 
190) = .47, p = .49). Finally, as expected, social norms of gratitude and empathy were 
higher in peer-to-peer (M = 3.02) compared to commercial services (M = 2.71, F(1, 190) 




The results of the Pretest Study were generally supportive of my predictions. In 
particular, the higher ratings in peer-to-peer services, coupled with a higher review rate, 
suggests that peer-to-peer ratings may be biased toward five-star ratings. As discussed, 
providing online ratings and reviews is effortful, and consumers who experience 
moderate levels of satisfaction are less likely to provide ratings than those who 




2018). Thus a higher review rate means that more consumers who experienced moderate 
satisfaction provided a rating, which should reduce the ratings average. The fact that 
ratings are higher (and five-star ratings are more likely) for peer-to-peer services despite 
the significantly higher review rate suggests that, as expected, self-selection is not a 
major cause of the biased positive distribution of peer-to-peer ratings.  
 
This begs the question: what other factors may be impacting peer-to-peer ratings? 
Expectancy disconfirmation was significantly higher for peer-to-peer services, which led 
to higher satisfaction in the overall dataset (although satisfaction was not significantly 
different in either accommodation or ride services individually). This was unexpected, 
especially because, as predicted, the level of expectations did not differ between 
commercial and peer-to-peer services. Thus, differences in expectancy disconfirmation 
were not driven by lower expectations. As expected, perceived risk was higher for peer-
to-peer services. Uncertainty did not differ, but this may be because the measure was 
retrospective. Where possible, the rest of the studies measure expectations, perceived 
risk, and uncertainty before participants experience the service, which is a more accurate 
reflection of how consumers feel in the moment.  
 
Provider causality and provider control did not significantly differ, but there were 
relatively few observations for these variables because expectancy disconfirmation was 
primarily positive. Studies 4, 5, and 6 will attempt to elicit negative disconfirmation, 
which will allow for a better analysis of these variables and their effects on trust for peer-




contextual factors that could lead to higher ratings in peer-to-peer services, including the 
consumer’s feeling that ratings are more important to peer providers, the need to justify 
ratings to peer providers, and social norms that encourage gratitude and empathy toward 
peer providers. The remaining studies will test how these variables affect the relationship 
between expectancy disconfirmation and ratings. Finally, the results of the Pretest Study 
suggest that there may be some important differences between the accommodation and 
ridesharing category. Future studies that examine more than one peer-to-peer category 
should include category-level dummy variables to control for these differences. 
 
5 Study 1 
 
The Pretest Study supported the prediction that ratings are higher in peer-to-peer services 
than commercial services, and that this is not a result of lower expectations. The review 
rate for peer-to-peer services was also higher, which suggests that the positive ratings 
distribution is not a result of self-selection, but rather, that individual consumer ratings 
may be biased. To determine the cause of this bias, we must understand how peer-to-peer 
consumers evaluate their service experiences, and how this may be different from 
consumers of commercial services. The objective of Study 1 is to test P1, which proposes 
that for peer-to-peer services, unlike for commercial services, satisfaction does not fully 
mediate the effect of expectancy disconfirmation on ratings (see Figure 3). Because of the 
risk and uncertainty in peer-to-peer services, it is important that consumers have their 
expectations met, with no surprises. Therefore, expectancy disconfirmation has an added 
value in peer-to-peer services, beyond its effect on satisfaction. This proposition will be 





H1.1: For commercial services, the relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and 
ratings is fully mediated by satisfaction  
 
H1.2: For peer-to-peer services, expectancy disconfirmation has both a direct effect and an 
indirect effect through satisfaction on ratings 
 
 
Figure 3: Model to be tested in Study 1 
 
The context for this study is food service, which is a category that is familiar to the 
participants, and which could plausibly be delivered by either a commercial or peer 
provider. To simulate real-world ratings decisions, the study involved deception by 
having participants believe that they were rating an actual new food service business. It 
was important to have realism in the studies because the positive ratings bias is impacted 
by social and network factors (such as trust, gratitude and empathy, importance of 
ratings, and feeling that ratings need to be justified). These contextual factors cannot be 







5.1.1 Participants & Design 
 
The experiment was conducted in the waiting area outside of a behavioral lab. 
Participants (N=146) were undergraduate students who were at the lab to complete an 
unrelated study for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (Service Type: commercial vs. peer-to-peer). A control condition was later 
added for additional information on the direction of results. While waiting to participate 
in the unrelated study, participants were approached by a confederate with a tray of 
chocolate chip cookies. The confederate was dressed in a blue t-shirt with a Home Café 
logo (commercial business condition) or a plain blue t-shirt with no logo (peer-to-peer 
and control conditions; see Appendix D). The confederate asked participants if they 
would like to sample a chocolate chip cookie, and to take part in a survey about a new 
food service called “Home Café” that had recently been approved by the university. We 
used a fabricated company name and brand logo to control for the fact that existing 
attitudes toward real brands could impact participant responses (Luffarelli et al., 2019).  
 
To encourage variance in ratings, the cookies had been left out overnight to prevent their 
freshness from creating a ceiling effect in participants’ ratings of quality. The confederate 
told participants that he baked the cookies himself that morning, either as an employee of 
a new business (commercial condition), or as a provider for a new peer-to-peer service 
(peer-to-peer condition). He subsequently explained that the new business sold and 
delivered home-style meals and snacks to students on campus, or that the service allowed 
students to sell and deliver their own homemade meals and snacks to other students on 




participants that the cookies were a new item for the campus cafeteria and that he was 
administering the survey on their behalf.  
 
After sampling a cookie, participants were handed a paper survey. The survey first asked 
participants to provide their email address to receive discounts and free items from Home 
Café. Email addresses were captured to encourage participants to answer the survey 
thoughtfully, knowing that the confederate and the business could contact them about 
their ratings. This enhanced the realism of the rating experience. Participants rated the 
cookie, and answered questions about their prior expectations, satisfaction, and how the 
cookie compared to their expectations (i.e., expectancy disconfirmation). The confederate 
told participants to place their completed surveys in a closed box, and that he would take 




The dependent measure is the rating for the cookie on a 5-star ratings scale. Participants 
then retroactively rated their expectations (i.e., their level of expectations prior to 
sampling the cookie) on a 10-pt scale (1=very low, 10=very high). Because of the design 
of the experiment, and the need for deception, it was not possible to measure expectations 
prior to consumption. However, expectations were measured before satisfaction, 
following the direction from Oliver (2010). Satisfaction was measured on a 10-point scale 
(“How satisfied were you with your experience;” 1=very Unsatisfied, 10=very Satisfied). 
I used a one-item measure for satisfaction because I wanted the participants to believe 




rather than for a research study. The one-item measure was used in the remaining studies 
for consistency. Finally, expectancy disconfirmation was measured on a 5-pt scale from 




5.2.1 Differences Between Conditions 
 
The Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Study 1 are in Appendix E. 
Descriptive statistics by condition are in Table 5. As predicted, participants’ expectations 
did not significantly differ between the commercial and peer-to-peer conditions 
(MCommercial = 5.98, MPeer = 6.17, F(1, 124) = .36, p = .55). Expectations also did not 
significantly differ between these conditions and the control condition (M = 6.50). There 
was no significant difference between the commercial and peer-to-peer conditions for 
rating (MCommercial = 4.33, MPeer = 4.23, F(1, 122) = .52, p = .47), satisfaction (MCommercial 
= 8.43, MPeer = 8.57, F(1, 123) = .30, p = .58), or expectancy disconfirmation (MCommercial 
= 4.11, MPeer = 4.29, F(1, 123) = .22, p = .14). The majority of participants in both the 
commercial and peer-to-peer conditions (87%) indicated that they experienced positive 
disconfirmation, which explains why ratings were similarly high in these two conditions. 
Although the cookies were left out overnight to reduce freshness, the fact that they were 
given out for free likely impacted the high levels of positive disconfirmation and 
satisfaction. Taking this into account, later studies will be designed to elicit more 





Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations for Study 1 
 
  Commercial Peer-to-Peer Control 
  N = 66 N = 58 N = 19 
Expectations      5.98 (1.77)    6.17 (1.84)     6.50 (1.44) 
Rating      4.33 (.72)    4.23 (.72)     4.11 (.59) 
Satisfaction      8.43 (1.45)    8.57 (1.30)     8.34 (1.13) 
Expectancy Disconfirmation      4.11 (.70)    4.29 (.67)     3.74 (.73) 
 
 
5.2.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
 
The expectancy disconfirmation paradigm predicts that product and service ratings 
should be affected by expectancy disconfirmation through satisfaction. To test this 
mediation, a series of bootstrap analyses were performed using 5000 samples and a 95% 
bias-corrected confidence interval (PROCESS Model 4, Hayes, 2018). Expectancy 
disconfirmation was the predictor, satisfaction was the mediator, and ratings was the 
dependent variable. As predicted, the indirect effect of expectancy disconfirmation on 
rating, through satisfaction, was significant for the control (β = .24, SE = .15, 95% CI: 
.01, .51), commercial (β = .39, SE = .11, 95% CI: .14, .62), and peer-to-peer conditions (β 
= . 39, SE = .12, 95% CI: .19, .66). 
 
In this study, it was further predicted that expectancy disconfirmation should have an 
additional effect on rating in the peer-to-peer condition because of the importance of trust 
when dealing with an unknown peer provider. Supporting H1.1, there was no direct effect 




95% CI: -.25, .10). This replicates extant research using the expectancy disconfirmation 
model. There was also no direct effect in the control condition (β = .02, SE = .13, 95% 
CI: -.26, .30). However, supporting H1.2, there was a direct effect of expectancy 
disconfirmation on rating for the peer-to-peer condition (β = .28, SE = .11, 95% CI: .06, 
.51). The direct effect and indirect effect (through satisfaction) are in the same direction, 




The results of Study 1 support proposition P1. For peer-to-peer services, expectancy 
disconfirmation has a direct effect on ratings beyond the mediated effect of satisfaction. 
The results show a distinction between peer-to-peer evaluations and commercial service 
evaluations, which follow the well-established expectancy disconfirmation process. The 
study further supports the assumptions outlined in Table 1; expectations are not 
significantly lower in peer-to-peer services, and ultimately, satisfaction is likely not the 
main driver of the positive bias in peer-to-peer ratings. As I have shown, in peer-to-peer 
services there is a direct route from expectancy disconfirmation to ratings, independent of 
satisfaction. A question still remains as to how this link operates. That is, how does 
expectancy disconfirmation affect ratings outside of its effect on satisfaction? Based on 
the theory and literature reviewed so far, I posit that trust is an important mediator in the 
peer-to-peer situation due to the higher uncertainty and perceived risk in peer-to-peer 





6 Study 2 
 
 
Study 1 demonstrated that expectancy disconfirmation directly affects ratings for peer-to-
peer services, in addition to the indirect effect through satisfaction. The objective of 
studies 2A and 2B is to demonstrate an important mechanism of this effect: trust. The 
studies will test propositions P2, P3, and P4. I propose that expectancy disconfirmation is 
more strongly related to trust when uncertainty is high (P2), because confirmed 
expectations demonstrate that the provider is able and willing to meet the consumer’s 
needs. I expect that trust is more strongly reflected in ratings when perceived risk is high 
(P3), because when a service is risky, the provider’s trustworthiness is a differentiating 
attribute that will be important for provider selection. Ratings in peer-to-peer services 
(which carry relatively higher uncertainty and risk than comparable commercial services) 
should thus be reflected by trust in addition to satisfaction (P4). I manipulate uncertainty 
in Study 2A to test P2. I then manipulate perceived risk in Study 2B to test P3 and P4. 
Table 6 lists the hypotheses to be tested and Figure 4 illustrates the model to be tested.  
 
Table 6: Study 2 Hypotheses 
  
  
2.1 Expectancy disconfirmation is positively related to trust in the service provider 
  
2.2 Uncertainty moderates the relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and trust; 
this relationship will be stronger when uncertainty is higher. 
  
2.3 Trust is positively related to ratings 
  
2.4 Perceived risk moderates the relationship between trust and ratings; this relationship 
will be stronger when perceived risk is higher. 
  
2.5 When uncertainty and perceived risk are high, expectancy disconfirmation is 








6.1 Study 2A Method 
 
Study 2A tested the first three hypotheses. I expected that expectancy disconfirmation is 
related to trust, and that this relationship is stronger when uncertainty is higher, as it is in 
peer-to-peer services. Further I expected that a consumer’s trust would be reflected in 
their ratings, per H2.3 (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Model to be tested in Study 2A 
 
 
6.1.1 Study 2A Participants, Design, and Measures 
 
One hundred and eighty-seven undergraduate students were recruited for course credit 
(80 women; Mage = 19.85 years). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions in a 2 (Service Type: commercial vs. peer-to-peer) x 2 (Service Tenure: new 
vs. established) between-subjects design. The study was completed in two phases. In the 
first phase, participants received an email from the lab manager with the instructions. The 




(“Netwrk”) to provide design services for students, and that the purpose of the study was 
to test the company’s services for resume design. The company name and brand logo 
were fabricated to control for the fact that existing attitudes toward real brands could 
impact participant responses. In the commercial conditions, Netwrk was described as a 
service for graphic design (posters, business cards, résumés, logos etc.) In the peer-to-
peer conditions, the description added that Netwrk was a peer-to-peer platform (like 
Airbnb and Uber) in which individual freelance designers can join the platform to be 
matched with potential customers. Further, in the new conditions, Netwrk was described 
as a brand new service that was currently in its pre-launch phase. The company had not 
yet launched to the public but had been working with prospective clients. Conversely, in 
the established conditions, Netwrk was described as being in business for the past two 
years and having an established client list. A provider’s reputation (i.e., evidence of past 
performance) helps consumers to form expectations, and is especially important for 
services because it is difficult to judge expected quality until they are consumed. When 
providers are new they have no reputation; thus consumers in the new conditions should 
be relatively more uncertain about the quality that they will receive (Kim & Peterson, 
2017; Lovett et al., 2013). 
 
Participants were provided with a link to the first of two surveys, where they were asked 
about their feelings about the upcoming experience including their expectations (1 item), 
perceived risk (1 item), and uncertainty (two items; α = .70), which were measured the 
same as in the Pretest Study. Results of a correlation analysis showed that there was no 




support that I was able to isolate uncertainty (and not risk) in the manipulation of Service 
Tenure. Finally, participants provided their email address and were told that a Netwrk 
designer would contact them via email later that day to begin the design process.  
 
The second phase of the study began approximately one hour after the participant had 
completed the first survey. Posing as a Netwrk designer, I sent an email to the participant 
(addressed from michaelm.netwrk@gmail.com) to start the design process (see Appendix 
F). The email began with a boilerplate from Netwrk stating that the company had 
assigned a graphic designer (“Michael”) to the project (commercial conditions) or that 
the company had matched the participant with a freelance designer to work on the project 
(peer-to-peer conditions). The boilerplate also included a short bio and a photograph of 
the designer. In the bio for the new conditions, the designer was described as having 
recently joined Netwrk. Further, Michael stated later in the email that this was one of his 
first design projects with the company. Conversely, in the established conditions, the 
designer was described in the bio as having completed over 100 projects with Netwrk. 
After the boilerplate, Michael introduced himself and explained that he needed some 
information from the participant: a copy of their current resume; some direction on the 
style of resume that they wanted including whether they preferred it to be classic or 
modern, and professional or artistic; and additional background information that could be 
used to customize the design. The answers to the style questions were used to select one 
of three resume design templates that would be used for the new design. 
 




into the selected template to create the new design. None of the information from the 
participant’s resume was changed. It was simply transferred into the new design template 
(for an example, see Appendix G). We used three design templates for the new resume 
rather than one because it was important for participants to feel that they were taking part 
in a real design experience and receiving a customized design. However, the templates 
may differentially affect the service evaluation so I created a dummy variable to identify 
which template was given to each participant (0 = No, 1 = Yes). These were then used as 
covariates for the hypothesis tests. The background information that the participants 
provided in their email was not used to personalize the design. Rather, the act of giving 
additional information was designed to increase the participant’s engagement.  
 
Participants responded to the email and provided the requested information. They 
received a thank you reply from the designer and were told that the designer would 
deliver their new design within 24 hrs, per Netwrk’s service policy. The following day, 
participants received a third email from the designer with the new resume. The email was 
delivered approximately one hour after the end of the 24-hour window, thus failing to 
meet the service commitment. The designer apologized, and stated that he was delayed 
because he was working on another project. The service failure was designed to increase 
the variance in expectancy disconfirmation based on the learning from Study 1 that 
participants tended to evaluate the “free” service experiences favorably. The email 
included a link to the second survey, on which participants could evaluate the service 
experience. First, participants were asked to provide a rating on a 5-star scale. They were 




so that they could post it on their website. Participants next indicated expectancy 
disconfirmation (1 item) which was measured the same as in the Pretest Study. 
Satisfaction (1 item) was next measured on a seven-point semantic differential scale 
(“Very Dissatisfied/Very Satisfied”). Finally, participants were asked to evaluate their 
trust in the provider, which was a four-item measure (α = .90) adapted from Sirdeshmukh 
et al. (2002). The scale included two items designed to measure provider reliability (“The 
designer is very reliable,” “The designer is very competent;” 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = 
Strongly Agree) and two items designed to measure provider integrity (“The designer has 
very high integrity,” “The designer can definitely be counted on to do what’s right;” 1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). 
 
6.2 Study 2A Results  
 
6.2.1 Differences Between Conditions 
 
The Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Study 2A are in Appendix H. 
Descriptive statistics by condition are in Table 7. Unexpectedly, the service tenure 
manipulation did not significantly increase uncertainty in the new (M = 2.90) compared 
to the established condition (M = 2.82 ; p = .63). I further expected that uncertainty would 
be higher for peer-peer services, but results showed that uncertainty did not significantly 
differ between the peer-to-peer (M = 2.90) and commercial conditions (M = 2.80 ; p = 
.51). The overall pattern of results were as expected; uncertainty was highest in the new 
peer-to-peer condition, and lowest in the established commercial service condition, 




expected and found that perceived risk was higher in the peer-to-peer (M = 3.08) 
compared to the commercial condition (M = 2.45; p < .01). As expected, perceived risk 
did not significantly differ between the service tenure conditions (MNew = 2.62; MEstablished 
= 2.97; p = .12). Participants’ expectations also did not significantly differ between any 
of the four conditions.  
 
Table 7: Means and Standard Deviations for Study 2A 
 







  N = 48 N = 53 N = 46 N = 40 
Expectations 5.26 (.94) 5.42 (.98) 5.50 (1.19) 5.40 (1.15) 
Perceived Risk 2.98 (1.45) 3.17 (1.54) 2.23 (1.31) 2.70 (1.71) 
Uncertainty 2.94 (1.09) 2.88 (.93) 2.85 (1.05) 2.75 (1.12) 
Rating 4.02 (1.04) 4.17 (.83) 4.22 (.97) 3.95 (1.08) 
Expectancy Disc. 4.22 (1.75) 4.44 (1.42) 4.58 (1.79) 4.13 (1.75) 
Satisfaction 4.74 (1.61) 5.02 (1.15) 5.31 (1.38) 4.72 (1.65) 
Trust 5.24 (1.29) 5.48 (.93) 5.75 (1.19) 5.34 (1.21) 
 
6.2.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
 
Next, hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2 were tested. Supporting H2.1, there was a significant 
positive relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and trust (β = .44, SE = .04, p < 
.01). To test H2.2, I performed two different analyses to demonstrate that the relationship 
between expectancy disconfirmation and trust is stronger when uncertainty is higher. 
Recall that I attempted to manipulate uncertainty through the service type and service 




such that the effect of expectancy disconfirmation on trust was highest for new peer-to-
peer services, because of higher uncertainty in that condition. From a moderated 
moderation analysis (PROCESS model 3; Hayes 2018), there was a marginally 
significant 2-way interaction between expectancy disconfirmation and service tenure, 
such that the effect of expectancy disconfirmation on trust was stronger in the “new” 
condition (β = .15, SE = .08, p < .10). The 2-way interaction with service type 
(commercial vs. peer-to-peer) was not significant (β = -.03, SE = .08, p = .71). Further, 
providing support for H2.2, there was a marginally significant 3-way interaction such the 
effect of expectancy disconfirmation on trust was highest in the new peer-to-peer 
condition (β = .32, SE = .17, p < .10). Next, a moderation analysis (PROCESS model 1; 
Hayes 2018) was conducted to directly test H2.2 with expectancy disconfirmation as the 
predictor, trust as the dependent variable, and uncertainty as the moderator. There was a 
positive main effect of expectancy disconfirmation on trust (β = .42, SE = .04, p < .01) 
and a negative main effect of uncertainty on trust (β = -.26, SE = .07, p < .01). However, 
the interaction was not significant (β = .06, SE = .04, p = .11, d = .25). 
 
Finally, I tested H2.3. As expected from H2.3, there was a significant positive relationship 
between trust and rating (β = .56, SE = .04, p < .01). To test this relationship further, I 
conducted a mediation analysis (PROCESS model 4; Hayes 2018) with expectancy 
disconfirmation as the predictor, trust as the mediator, and rating as the dependent 
variable. As expected, there was a significant indirect effect of disconfirmation on rating 
through the mediator trust (β = .14, SE = .03, 95% CI: .08, .20). This process will be 





6.3 Study 2A Discussion 
 
The results of Study 2A provide some support that expectancy disconfirmation is related 
to trust, and that trust is related to ratings. However, the predicted interaction between 
expectancy disconfirmation and uncertainty on trust (H2.2) was not significant. There 
were a few issues in this study that may have contributed to the non-significant result. 
First, the manipulation for service tenure was not successful in creating significant 
differences in uncertainty, and there also was no significant difference between the peer-
to-peer and commercial conditions. This may have been impacted by the fact that overall 
levels of uncertainty across the conditions were relatively low. The fact that “Netwrk” 
was altering the participant’s existing resume rather than building a brand new resume 
may have contributed to this result. Further, the effect size of the interaction between 
expectancy disconfirmation and uncertainty on trust was relatively small. Some 
participants may have guessed that they were participating in a scenario as part of a 
research study rather than interacting with a real provider, which could have affected this 
result. Although the deception in this study was well designed, it is not known how many 
participants were deceived. Attempts were made to address these issues in Study 2B. 
 
6.4 Study 2B Method 
 
Study 2B was designed to test the effect of trust on rating (H2.3) and the moderating effect 




mediation described in H2.5. Specifically, I predicted that the effect of expectancy 
disconfirmation on rating would be mediated by trust (in addition to satisfaction), and 
that the mediation through trust would be strengthened when uncertainty and risk are 
higher (see Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: Model to be tested in Study 2B 
 
 
6.4.1 Study 2B Participants, Design, and Measures 
 
Two hundred and nine undergraduate students were recruited for course credit (105 
women; Mage = 19.28 years). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions in a 2 (Service Type: commercial vs. peer-to-peer) x 2 (Risk Level: high vs. 
low) between-subjects design. The study followed a similar design to Study 2A. The 
same variables from Study 2A were measured in Study 2B in the same fashion. 
Additionally, I included a measure to assess the effectiveness of the deception. 




during the experience, they believed that they were interacting with a real design 
company and designer (“When you were participating in this study, how much did you 
believe that Netwrk was a real company and that a real designer was working on your 
project?;” 1 = I felt completely sure that Netwrk was fake and this was only for research, 
4 = I was not sure whether this was fake or real, 7 = I felt completely sure that Netwrk 
and its designer were real). Nearly 90% of participants felt somewhat to completely sure 
that the experience was real (i.e., a rating of 5, 6, or 7). The other 24 participants who 
questioned the veracity of the experience were removed from the data to improve the 
precision of the analyses (final sample of 185 participants, 91 women; Mage = 19.28 
years). 
 
As in Study 2A, the study was completed in two phases. In the first phase, participants 
received an email from the lab manager with the instructions. They were told that they 
would be testing a new service for logo design. Service type was manipulated in the same 
fashion as in Study 2A. In the commercial conditions, the email from the lab manager 
described Netwrk as a service for graphic design, while in the peer-to-peer conditions, 
the description added that Netwrk was a peer-to-peer platform (like Airbnb and Uber) in 
which individual freelance designers can join the platform. Further, in the high risk 
conditions, the email from the lab manager included a prominent warning that Netwrk 
was a third-party website that was not affiliated with the University. Participants were 
told that by participating in the study, they would be sharing personal information with 
this third-party website and a designer, and that the University could not guarantee the 




begin the first survey, they were acknowledging that they had read the warning and were 
accepting the risk. The same warning was included in the first survey. After reading the 
letter of information in the survey, participants read that by participating in the study, 
they would be sharing personal information with a third-party website, and that the 
University could not guarantee the privacy of the information. Participants clicked 
forward in the survey to indicate that they acknowledged the risk. These warnings were 
not included in the low risk conditions.  
 
Participants completed the first survey to indicate their expectations (1 item), perceived 
risk (1 item), and uncertainty (two items; α = .75), and provided an email address through 
which they could be contacted by the designer. Results of a correlation analysis showed 
that there was a weak correlation between perceived risk and uncertainty (r = .18, p < .05) 
which provides some support that I was able to isolate risk (and not uncertainty) in the 
manipulation of Risk Level. The second phase of the study began approximately one hour 
after the participant had completed the first survey. Posing as a Netwrk designer, I sent an 
email to the participant including a boilerplate with a short bio and photograph of the 
designer. The boilerplate stated that Netwrk had assigned a graphic designer (commercial 
conditions) or stated that the participant had been matched with a freelance designer 
(peer-to-peer conditions). After the boilerplate, the designer introduced himself and 
explained that he needed some information from the participant to start the design 
process: their first and last name along with a key phrase or motto to include in the 
design; some direction on the style of logo that they wanted including whether they 




highlight their interests from a list of choices including sports, music, art and business, 
which would help the designer determine a theme for the logo. The answers to the style 
and interest questions were used to select one of three design templates that would be 
used for the new logo. Because the templates may differentially affect the service 
evaluation, I created a dummy variable to identify which template was given to each 
participant (0 = No, 1 = Yes). These were used as covariates in the hypothesis tests. 
 
Participants responded to the email and provided the requested information. They 
received a thank you reply from the designer and were told that the designer would 
deliver their new design within 24 hrs, per the Netwrk service policy. The following day, 
approximately one hour after the end of the 24-hour window, participants received a third 
email from the designer with the personalized logo design (see Appendix I for examples). 
The email included a link to the second survey, on which participants could evaluate the 
service experience. On the survey, participants were asked to provide a rating on a 5-star 
scale. They were told that the rating would be assigned to the designer, and would be 
shared with Netwrk so that they could post it on their website. Participants also indicated 
expectancy disconfirmation (1 item), satisfaction (1 item), and trust (four items; α = .92).  
 
6.5 Study 2B Results 
 
6.5.1 Differences Between Conditions 
 




Descriptive statistics by condition are in Table 8. As expected, uncertainty was higher in 
the peer-to-peer (M = 3.17) compared to commercial condition (M = 2.86 ; p = .05), and 
uncertainty did not differ between the risk level conditions (MHigh = 3.04; MLow = 2.99; p 
= .75). However, the risk level manipulation did not significantly increase perceived risk 
in the high (M = 3.01) compared to the low risk condition (M = 2.83 ; p = .37). Perceived 
risk also did not significantly differ between the peer-to-peer (M = 2.87) and commercial 
conditions (M = 2.97 ; p = .62).  
 
Table 8: Means and Standard Deviations for Study 2B 
 
  P2P                  High Risk 






  N = 46 N = 44 N = 47 N = 48 
Expectations 5.02 (1.33) 5.05 (1.16) 4.89 (1.15) 5.25 (1.06) 
Perceived Risk 2.98 (1.31) 2.75 (1.51) 3.04 (1.32) 2.90 (1.43) 
Uncertainty 3.20 (1.20) 3.15 (1.02) 2.88 (1.00) 2.84 (.95) 
          
Rating 4.07 (.95) 4.20 (.93) 3.96 (1.12) 4.21 (.80) 
Expectancy Disc. 4.70 (1.64) 4.57 (1.50) 4.51 (1.57) 4.35 (1.41) 
Satisfaction 5.11 (1.55) 5.43 (1.50) 5.04 (1.49) 5.15 (1.38) 
Trust 5.74 (1.14) 5.82 (1.37) 5.72 (1.24) 5.67 (.97) 
 
6.5.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
 
Next, hypotheses H2.3 and H2.4 were tested. Supporting H2.3, there was a significant 
positive relationship between trust and rating (β = .58, SE = .04, p < .01). To support H2.4, 




was highest for the high risk peer-to-peer condition, because of higher perceived risk in 
that condition. From a moderated moderation analysis (PROCESS model 3; Hayes 2018), 
there was a significant 2-way interaction such that the effect of trust on rating was 
stronger in the high risk condition (β = .18, SE = .09, p = .03). However, the 2-way 
interaction with service type was not significant (β = .16, SE = .20, p = .42) and the three-
way interaction was also not significant (β = -.11, SE = .17, p = .52). Next, a moderation 
analysis was conducted to directly test H2.4 (PROCESS model 1; Hayes 2018). Trust was 
the predictor, rating was the dependent variable, and perceived risk was the moderator. 
However, the interaction between trust and perceived risk was not significant (β = .01, SE 
= .03, p = .63).  
 
Finally, to test H2.5, a multiple moderated mediation analysis was conducted (PROCESS 
model 21; Hayes 2018). Expectancy disconfirmation was the predictor, trust was the 
mediator, and rating was the dependent variable. Uncertainty was the first moderator, and 
perceived risk was the second moderator. There was a significant positive main effect of 
expectancy disconfirmation on trust (which supports H2.1; β = .50, SE = .04, p < .01). 
There was also a significant negative main effect of uncertainty on trust (β = -.30, SE = 
.06, p < .01). As expected, there was a significant positive interaction between 
expectancy disconfirmation and uncertainty (supporting H2.2; β = .06, SE = .03, p < .05, d 
= .31) such that the effect of expectancy disconfirmation on trust was stronger when 
uncertainty was higher. The effect size of this interaction was larger in Study 2B than 
Study 2A, and the interaction was significant, which might be related to the fact that 




positive main effect of trust on rating (which supports H2.3; β = .33, SE = .05, p < .01). 
The main effect of perceived risk on rating was not significant (β = -.03, SE = .03, p = 
.45), and the interaction between trust and perceived risk was also not significant (β = 
.01, SE = .03, p = .63). Further, there was a significant direct effect of expectancy 
disconfirmation on rating (β = .29, SE = .04, p < .01). The indirect effect of expectancy 
disconfirmation through the mediator trust was significant at all levels of the moderators.  
 
Finally, the full model from Figure 5 was tested to demonstrate that trust has an effect on 
ratings beyond the effect of satisfaction (as described in P4). Perceived risk was not 
included in the analysis because of the earlier non-significant result. A parallel moderated 
mediation analysis was conducted with expectancy disconfirmation as the predictor, 
satisfaction and trust as parallel mediators, uncertainty as the moderator, and rating as the 
dependent variable (PROCESS model 7; Hayes 2018). That is, the path from expectancy 
disconfirmation to satisfaction to rating (moderated by uncertainty) was tested in parallel 
to the path from expectancy disconfirmation to trust to rating (see Figure 6). As expected, 
the interaction between expectancy disconfirmation and uncertainty on satisfaction was 
not significant (β = .02, SE = .04, p = .63). Also as expected, the indirect effect of 
expectancy disconfirmation on rating through satisfaction was significant at all levels of 
uncertainty, and the index of moderated mediation for this path was not significant (IMM 
= .01, 95% CI: -.02, .03). The indirect effect of expectancy disconfirmation on rating 
through trust was also significant at all levels of uncertainty. However, providing some 
support for the proposed process, the index of moderated mediation was marginally 




indirect effect through trust was larger when uncertainty was high (M+1SD = 4.06; 
βindirect = .06, 95% CI: .001, .13), compared to when uncertainty was medium (MMEAN = 
3.01; βindirect = .05, 95% CI: .001, .11) and when uncertainty was low (M-1SD = 1.97; 
βindirect =.04, 95% CI: .001, .10). Finally, there was a significant direct effect of 
expectancy disconfirmation on rating (β = .15, SE = .04, p < .01). 
 
 
Figure 6: Results of Study 2B Parallel Moderated Mediation Analysis 
 
6.6 Discussion and Subsequent Analysis 
 
Study 2B provides support that expectancy disconfirmation leads to trust, and that this 
relationship is strengthened when uncertainty is high. To improve the precision of the 
results in this study, I measured and removed participants who suspected that Netwrk was 
not a real company. However, it is possible that the participants who suspected the 
deception may, in general, have a lower overall level of trust. Thus their removal may be 




participants in the moderation analysis to test H2.2 (PROCESS model 1; Hayes 2018), the 
predicted interaction between expectancy disconfirmation and uncertainty on trust is no 
longer significant (β = .04, SE = .03, p = .15). I still believe that it is more appropriate to 
remove these participants because if they did not believe that they were transacting with a 
real designer and a real company, then they would not feel the same level of trust or 
distrust as they would if they knew that Netwrk was fake. However, for robustness, I will 
test this relationship again in Study 3 with customers of a real peer-to-peer company who 
report on their actual perceptions of trust in their providers. I also note that the removal of 
the participants who suspected the deception did not materially affect any of the other 
reported results in Study 2B. 
 
The manipulation for perceived risk failed to generate significant differences between 
conditions, and perceived risk also did not significantly differ between the peer-to-peer 
and the commercial conditions. These results may have been impacted by the fact that 
perceived risk was relatively low in all conditions. In retrospect, the resume design 
experience might have worked better in Study 2B because resumes include more personal 
information and thus may be considered to be riskier. The logo design experience might 
have worked better in Study 2A because logos have more uncertainty than resumes 
(which are built from existing versions and are more standardized in format). 
 
Study 2B also finds support that trust is positively related to ratings. However, the 
predicted moderation by perceived risk on the relationship between trust and ratings 




terms of the ways in which perceptions of trust affect ratings. In particular, upon 
reflection, the effect of trust on ratings may be partly realized through increased 
satisfaction (i.e., trust à satisfaction à ratings) and this relationship may be affected by 
perceived risk. Satisfaction and trust are closely related constructs, and both have been 
found to be associated with word-of-mouth (Ranaweera & Prabhu, 2003). Both constructs 
are important factors in exchange relationships (Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Smith, 
1998), but there has been relatively little research devoted to exploring the relationship 
between them (Selnes, 1998). While many researchers have proposed a causal 
relationship between satisfaction and trust, some have argued that satisfaction leads to 
trust (e.g., Ganesan, 1994; Martin et al., 2011; Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 2000) while others 
have argued that trust leads to satisfaction (e.g., Chen & Chou, 2012; Chiou & Droge, 
2006; Smith & Barclay, 1997).  
 
The direction of causality between trust and satisfaction may be context dependent, but 
the moderators of the relationship have not been rigorously explored. One factor that may 
affect the relationship is perceived risk. Indeed, the role of trust is to reduce perceived 
risk, which can lead to satisfaction (Chen & Chou, 2012). Thus if perceived risk is high 
before an exchange, it stands to reason that demonstrated trustworthiness in this high risk 
environment should drive higher levels of satisfaction. The argument for this relationship 
is similar to my earlier argument about why perceived risk should strengthen the 
relationship between trust and ratings (i.e., H2.4). When risk is high and the outcome of 
service failure is severe (e.g., a bungee jumping experience), then provider 




expectancy disconfirmation, should therefore have a stronger impact on satisfaction when 
risk is high, above and beyond other important factors such as product quality.   
 
To test this relationship, a moderation analysis was conducted with trust as the predictor, 
satisfaction as the dependent variable, and perceived risk as the moderator (PROCESS 
model 1; Hayes 2018). There was a significant positive effect of trust on satisfaction (β = 
.98, SE = .06, p < .01) and as predicted, the interaction was positive and significant (β = 
.09, SE = .04, p = .02) such that the effect of trust on satisfaction is strengthened when 
perceived risk is higher. Further, when expectancy disconfirmation and uncertainty were 
added to the model (i.e., PROCESS model 21; Hayes 2018) we find the two expected 
interactions; there was a significant positive interaction between expectancy 
disconfirmation and uncertainty on trust (β = .06, SE = .03, p = .04) and a significant 
positive interaction between trust and perceived risk on satisfaction (β = .09, SE = .03, p 
= .01). Thus, the subsequent analysis provides some support that trust may lead to 
increased satisfaction when perceived risk is high. These relationships will be tested 
again in Study 3, which will also test the impact of ratings importance and need to justify 
on the effects of satisfaction and trust on ratings. 
 
 
7 Study 3 
 
Study 2 demonstrated that both trust and satisfaction are important for service evaluations 
when uncertainty and perceived risk are relatively high, as they are in peer-to-peer 




satisfaction lead to positive bias in peer-to-peer ratings through propositions P5, P6a and 
P6b. Specifically, I expect that when expectations are merely met (rather than exceeded), 
trust is higher than satisfaction (P5). This is because to demonstrate trustworthiness, 
providers are only required to meet (and not exceed) their promises and commitments. 
Thus, when expectations are merely met, ratings that are more affected by trust will be 
higher than ratings that are more affected by satisfaction.  
 
But what causes the effect of satisfaction to be reduced relative to the effect of trust? I 
propose that network factors in peer-to-peer platforms, namely, a feeling that ratings are 
more important to peer providers, and that ratings need to be justified, weakens the effect 
of satisfaction on ratings (i.e., P6a). Satisfaction is based on fulfillment of needs, and 
needs are unique to the individual. Thus satisfaction is somewhat subjective and may be 
difficult to justify. On the other hand, trust is demonstrated when a provider meets 
commitments (i.e., when expectations are confirmed). If a provider does not meet specific 
commitments, lower ratings are easier to justify. But if a provider meets commitments, it 
would be difficult to justify a lower rating, especially because ratings are so important for 
peer providers. The importance of ratings may further contribute to bias by motivating 
consumers to post higher ratings than may otherwise be deserved (i.e., P6b). As long as 
the provider demonstrated trustworthiness, consumers who recognize the importance of 
ratings may post higher ratings so that they don’t harm providers from future business.  
 
Study 1 and Study 2 were performed in a controlled environment that was not able to 




address these concerns through a field experiment with an actual peer-to-peer service. I 
further manipulate the perceived anonymity of ratings and the ratings visibility (public or 
private) to determine whether they can reduce perceived ratings importance and a need to 
justify ratings. In doing so, I can test whether positive ratings bias can be attenuated 




Figure 7: Model to be tested in Study 3 
 
Finally, Study 3 also tests two new hypotheses that stem from the subsequent analysis 
performed in Study 2B. That is, that trust is positively related to satisfaction, and that 
perceived risk moderates the relationship between trust and satisfaction. Table 9 lists the 





Table 9: Study 3 Hypotheses 
  
  
3.1 Satisfaction is positively related to ratings. 
  
3.2 A need to justify ratings decisions moderates the relationship between satisfaction and 
ratings; this relationship will be weaker when need to justify is higher. 
  
3.3  Perceived ratings importance moderates the relationship between satisfaction and 
consumer ratings; this relationship will be weaker when ratings importance is higher. 
  
3.4  Perceived ratings importance is positively related to ratings. 
  
  
3.5 Trust is positively related to satisfaction. 
  
3.6 Perceived risk moderates the relationship between trust and satisfaction; this 







7.1.1 Participants & Design.  
 
Three hundred and seventy-one participants were recruited for a field experiment with 
RVezy, a peer-to-peer platform for recreational vehicles. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Rating Visibility: public vs. private) x 2 (Rater 
Identification: individual vs. anonymous) between-subjects design. Participants were 
customers of RVezy and completed two surveys. The first survey was completed shortly 
after booking the RV rental but prior to taking possession of the vehicle, and the second 
was completed shortly after the rental experience had ended. Thirteen participants (3.5%) 
were removed from the study because of inconsistent results, likely stemming from a 
survey visibility issue on mobile devices that caused some answer choices to not appear 
on screen. On a single-item question, these thirteen participants rated provider trust at the 




matched their feelings toward the provider in an open-ended question), but then they 
rated multiple-item reliability and integrity (and three other items on the same measure) 
at the bottom of the scale (i.e., 1 of 7). The top-of-scale answer choices for these seven 
items did not appear on screen on mobile devices which likely caused this issue. The final 
sample included 358 RVezy customers (196 women; Mage = 46.44 years). The majority 
of participants (91.3%) had no prior rental experience with RVezy, while 7.3% had 
rented from RVezy one other time, and the remaining 1.4% had rented from RVezy two 
or more times in the past.  
 
The field experiment was conducted during the prime rental season from June to Sept. 
2019. The RV rental process begins online. Consumers who navigate to the RVezy.com 
website can view rental prices, names and photos of the owners, details about the vehicle 
(which are provided by the owners), and ratings and reviews from prior customers (see 
Appendix K). Bookings are made through the website. Immediately after finalizing a 
booking during the study period, customers received an email from RVezy asking if they 
would like to take part in the study in exchange for a chance to win an iPad prize. The 
email contained a link to the first survey, where participants indicated their expectations, 
perceived risk, and uncertainty (α = .87). These variables were measured the same as in 
the prior studies. The correlation between perceived risk and uncertainty was moderate (r 
= .46, p < .01). Participants completed the survey, and then began their rental experience. 
 
After the experience, at the close of rental, the participant received an email from RVezy 




rate your RV experience. Specifically, please rate the RV and RV owner on a five-star 
scale”. The instructions were designed to make the participant believe that their ratings 
were part of the real RVezy ratings process, rather than being delivered only as part of the 
research. Additional instructions were included to operationalize the two factors. In the 
public rating conditions, participants were told that their rating would be posted publicly 
to the RVezy.com website on the profile page for the RV owner that they rented from. 
They were further told that their feedback was important for other RVezy consumers to 
help them decide which RV to choose for their rental. I expected that these instructions 
would prompt participants to consider the importance of ratings to providers for attracting 
future customers. In the private rating conditions, participants were told that their rating 
would be posted privately to the RVezy owner. It would not be posted to the website and 
would not be viewable by other consumers. They were further told that their feedback 
was important for RVezy owners to help them understand how well they are performing. 
I expected that, compared to the public conditions, these instructions would make 
participants feel that their rating was relatively less important. This is because private 
ratings, which are not visible to other consumers, cannot affect the provider’s reputation 
and future business with those consumers. I also expected that because the ratings were 
sent directly to the provider, participants may still feel strongly that they might have to 
justify their ratings decision to the provider.   
 
Further, in the individual rating conditions, participants were told that their rating 
represented their individual feedback. I expected that these instructions would prompt 




participant gave. In the anonymous rating conditions, participants were told that the RV 
owner would not see their individual rating because it would be aggregated (i.e., 
“averaged”) with the ratings from other consumers who had previously rented the same 
RV. I expected that, in comparison to the individual rating conditions, these instructions 
should make participants feel that their rating is less important. This is because their 
rating is part of collective feedback, and may not dramatically affect the overall aggregate 
score for the provider. I also expected that need to justify should be lower because 
providers cannot identify the participant’s specific rating. Providers should thus be less 
likely to question the rating or to retaliate against a low rating.  
 
Next, participants indicated whether, as they were making their rating decision, they felt a 
need to justify the rating. This was a five-item measure (α = .73). Participants were given 
the instruction “When I was making my ratings decision…” (“I felt that I might need to 
justify my ratings choice to the RV owner,” “I felt that I might have to explain my ratings 
choice,” “I felt that my rating needed to be completely fair to the RV owner,” “I felt that I 
needed to have clear reasons to support my ratings choice,” “I felt that I might be 
criticized by the RV owner for my ratings choice;” 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very Much). Next, 
ratings importance (3 items; α = .80) was measured similarly to the Pretest Study (“How 
important is your rating to your RV owner,” “How closely do you think your RV owner 
will monitor your online rating,” “How much do you think your rating will affect the RV 
owner’s future rentals;” 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very/Very Much).  
 




which were measured the same as in Study 2. Trust was measured by the same four items 
as in previous studies (α = .95) but was rated on a seven-point semantic differential scale 
(“My provider has very low integrity/My provider has very high integrity,” “My provider 
definitely cannot be counted on to do what’s right/My provider definitely can be counted 
on to do what’s right,” “My provider is very unreliable/My provider is very reliable,” 
“My provider is very incompetent/My provider is very competent”). Three additional 
items were included on the same semantic differential scale to gather additional feedback 
about the provider: helpfulness (“My provider is very unhelpful/My provider is very 
helpful”), friendliness (“My provider is very unfriendly/My provider is very friendly”), 
and professionalism (“My provider is very unprofessional/My provider is very 
professional”). An additional one-item measure for provider trustworthiness was included 
to determine how well that the four-item measure (which taps into the two dimensions of 
integrity and reliability) would correlate with this more global measure (“How 
trustworthy is the RV owner that you rented from?; 1 = Very Untrustworthy, 7 = Very 
Trustworthy”). Results confirmed that the two measures were moderately to strongly 
correlated (r = .69, p < .01). Finally, participants answered an open-ended question to 




7.2.1 Differences Between Conditions 
 




Descriptive statistics by condition are in Table 10. I expected that both ratings importance 
and need to justify ratings would be higher in the individual vs. anonymous condition, 
and that ratings importance would also be higher in the public vs. private ratings 
condition. As expected, ratings were considered to be more important in the individual 
(M = 6.18) compared to the anonymous (i.e., aggregated rating) condition (M = 5.97, F(1, 
355) = 4.14, p < .05). However, there was no significant difference in need to justify 
between the two conditions (MIndividual = 3.68, MAnonymous = 3.74, F(1, 355) = 1.40, p = 
.75). This may have been due to confusion with how the question was interpreted. 
Although the instructions for this question asked participants to reflect on whether they 
considered the need to justify while they were making their decision on ratings, the rating 
itself may have impacted feelings toward the need to justify after the decision. That is, for 
some participants, rather than a need to justify causing them to artificially inflate their 
ratings (i.e., make the ratings more positive so that they won’t have to justify them to the 
provider), the fact that the rating was high caused them to answer that they felt less likely 
that they then needed to justify the rating. Thus, rather than a positive relationship 
between need to justify and ratings (i.e., a high need to justify leads to high ratings), I 
found a negative relationship in this data (i.e., a high rating leads to lower feelings that 
the rating would then need to be justified; β = -.40, SE = .11, p < .01). 
 
As expected, the need to justify also did not differ between the public and private 
conditions (MPublic = 3.61, MPrivate = 3.81, F(1, 355) = 1.91, p = .17). However, 
unexpectedly, there was no significant difference in ratings importance for these 




not show any difference in ratings importance between the individual public (M = 6.25) 
and individual private conditions (M = 6.11, t(353) = .96, p = .34), nor any difference 
between the anonymous public (M = 5.93) and anonymous private conditions (M = 6.01, 
t(353) = -.49, p = .63). Thus the public and private conditions were collapsed into the 
individual and anonymous conditions for the rest of the analyses.  
 
Table 10: Means and Standard Deviations for Study 3 
 







  N = 86 N = 90 N = 95 N = 87 
Expectations 5.92 (.96) 6.02 (.82) 5.99 (.98) 6.15 (1.03) 
Perceived Risk 3.50 (1.47) 3.21 (1.47) 3.38 (1.63) 3.05 (1.50) 
Uncertainty 2.48 (.96) 2.17 (.95) 2.42 (1.08) 2.19 1.08) 
          
Rating 4.78 (.52) 4.73 (.58) 4.52 (.90) 4.63 (.63) 
Need to Justify 3.52 (1.25) 3.84 (1.38) 3.70 (1.35) 3.78 (1.51) 
Ratings Importance 6.25 (.80) 6.11 (.99) 5.93 (1.06) 6.01 (1.03) 
Expectancy Disc. 5.97 (1.24) 6.03 (1.17) 5.56 (1.49) 5.76 (1.23) 
Satisfaction 6.47 (.94) 6.50 (.72) 6.15 (1.37) 6.44 (.87) 
Trust 6.79 (.49) 6.83 (.45) 6.48 (1.04) 6.75 (.64) 
Helpful 6.87 (.43) 6.86 (.57) 6.57 (1.11) 6.82 (.54) 
Friendly 6.91 (.33) 6.93 (.36) 6.67 (.94) 6.84 (.55) 
Professional 6.74 (.67) 6.73 (.72) 6.39 (1.17) 6.69 (.78) 
Trustworthiness  6.83 (.47) 6.81 (.67) 6.58 (.94) 6.72 (.64) 
 
I next compared the individual conditions to the anonymous conditions for the other 
variables. As expected, the manipulations did not affect participants’ expectations 




3.35, MAnonymous = 3.22, F(1, 356) = .68, p = .41), and uncertainty (MIndividual = 2.32, 
MAnonymous = 2.31, F(1, 356) = .01, p = .94).  
 
As expected, ratings were higher in the individual conditions (M = 4.76) compared to the 
anonymous conditions (M = 4.57, F(1, 356) = 6.63, p < .05). However, unexpectedly, 
expectancy disconfirmation (MIndividual = 6.00, MAnonymous = 5.66, F(1, 356) = 6.39, p < 
.05) and trust (MIndividual = 6.81, MAnonymous = 6.61, F(1, 356) = 7.39, p < .01) were also 
significantly higher in the individual conditions, and satisfaction was marginally higher 
as well (MIndividual = 6.48, MAnonymous = 6.29, F(1, 356) = 3.38, p < .10). Consumers in the 
individual condition also considered their providers to be significantly more helpful 
(MIndividual = 6.86, MAnonymous = 6.69, F(1, 356) = 5.30, p < .05), friendly (MIndividual = 6.92, 
MAnonymous = 6.75, F(1, 356) = 6.85, p < .01), and professional (MIndividual = 6.74, 
MAnonymous = 6.53, F(1, 356) = 5.00, p < .05). It’s possible that the actual quality of the 
vehicles and providers in the individual conditions might have been significantly higher 
on average than in the anonymous conditions, but this is unlikely given the sample size. 
Instead it is more likely that, after providing their rating, some participants may have felt 
the need to seek consistency between the rating and their evaluations so that the rating did 
not appear to be or feel to be biased. Participants may also have felt that their answers to 
these questions might be shared with the RV owner in the individual conditions, which 
may have caused them to be assessed higher.   
 





Next, P5 was tested. Proposition P5 states that trust will be higher than satisfaction when 
expectations are merely met. This proposition is not directly testable because it requires 
the statistical comparison of two different variables. However, both variables were 
similarly operationalized as seven-point semantic differential scales, so I performed a t-
test comparison of their mean scores for all participants who indicated that their 
expectations were merely met (N = 39). Supporting P5, the difference between the mean 
score for satisfaction (M = 6.13) and the mean score for trust (M = 6.62) was statistically 
significant (t(76) = -2.59, p < .05). Trust was significantly higher than satisfaction when 
expectations were merely met.  
 
Next, the hypotheses were tested. To test H3.1 and H3.2, a moderation analysis was 
conducted with satisfaction as the predictor, rating as the dependent variable, and need to 
justify as the moderator. As expected, the main effect of need to justify on ratings was not 
significant (β = -.02, SE = .02, p = .31). Supporting H3.1, there was a significant positive 
main effect of satisfaction on rating (β = .53, SE = .03, p < .01). However, the interaction 
was not significant (β = -.02, SE = .02, p = .37) which again may be due to issues with 
how the question for need to justify was interpreted. 
 
Next, to test H3.1, H3.3 and H3.4,  a moderation analysis was conducted with satisfaction as 
the predictor, rating as the dependent variable, and ratings importance as the moderator 
(PROCESS model 1; Hayes 2018). Supporting H3.1, there was a significant positive main 
effect of satisfaction on rating (β = .36, SE = .03, p < .01). Supporting H3.4, there was a 




supporting H3.3, there was a significant negative interaction (β = -.13, SE = .02, p < .01, d 
= .70) such that the effect of satisfaction on rating is weaker when ratings importance is 
higher.  
 
In a separate test of these hypotheses, I used the rater identification conditions as a proxy 
measure for ratings importance (recall that ratings importance is higher when a rater 
believes that their rating is identifiable). First, a moderation analysis was conducted with 
satisfaction as the predictor, rating as the dependent variable, and rater identification as 
the moderator. Rater identification was a dummy variable (0 = anonymous, 1 = 
individual). Supporting H3.1,  there was a significant positive main effect of satisfaction 
on rating (β = .50, SE = .02, p < .01). Supporting H3.4, there was a significant positive 
main effect of rater identification, such that ratings are higher when raters believe that 
they can be individually identified by providers (β = .09, SE = .05, p < .01). Finally, 
supporting H3.3, there was a significant negative interaction (β = -.10, SE = .05, p < .05, d 
= .23) such that the effect of satisfaction on rating is weaker when raters are individually 
identified compared to when they are anonymous.  
 
To provide further support for P5 and P6, I tested the full indirect relationship from 
expectancy disconfirmation to ratings using a series of parallel moderated mediation 
analyses (PROCESS model 14; Hayes 2018). The indirect path from expectancy 
disconfirmation to ratings through the mediator satisfaction was tested in parallel to the 
indirect path through the mediator trust. The analyses separately tested the three different 




identification). First, need to justify was the moderator. There was a significant positive 
main effect of expectancy disconfirmation on rating (β = .13, SE = .02, p < .01), and as 
expected, there was a significant main effect of trust on rating (β = .12, SE = .04, p = .01) 
and satisfaction on rating (β = .36, SE = .03, p < .01). As expected, the main effect of 
need to justify was not significant (β = .01, SE = .02, p = .98). Supporting H3.2, there was 
a significant negative interaction between satisfaction and need to justify (β =-.07, SE = 
.02, p < .01, d = .18) such that the effect of satisfaction on rating is weaker when a 
consumer feels a higher need to justify their rating. The indirect effect of disconfirmation 
on ratings through the mediator satisfaction was significant for all levels of need to 
justify, but the effect size was smaller for those who felt a relatively high need to justify 
(M+1SD = 5.09; βindirect =.14, 95% CI: .08, .22) compared to those who felt a relatively 
low need to justify (M-1SD = 2.33; βindirect =.24, 95% CI: .14, .32). I expected that need 
to justify would not similarly reduce the effect of trust on ratings, because trust 
assessments (based on whether the provider met commitments) are easier to justify. 
However, in fact, need to justify further strengthened the effect of trust. There was a 
significant positive interaction between trust and need to justify (β =.09, SE = .03, p < 
.01, d = .14) such that the effect of trust on rating is stronger when a consumer feels a 
higher need to justify their rating (see Figure 8). A Johnson-Neyman analysis showed that 
this indirect effect was significant when need to justify was at a value of 3.40 (out of 7) or 
higher (approximately 45% of participants). Further, the indirect effect of disconfirmation 
on ratings through the mediator trust was significant for individuals who felt a relatively 
higher need to justify (M+1SD = 5.09; βindirect = .07, 95% CI: .02, .12) or medium need to 




significant for those who felt a relatively lower need to justify (M-1SD = 2.33; βindirect 
=.00, 95% CI: -.05, .12).  
 
 
Figure 8: The Effect of Trust on Ratings at Different Levels of Need to Justify 
 
Next, ratings importance was included in the analysis as the moderator for the 
relationship between trust and ratings and between satisfaction and ratings. There was a 
significant positive main effect of disconfirmation on rating (β = .12, SE = .02, p < .01). 
Supporting H3.1, there was a significant positive main effect of satisfaction on rating (β = 
.23, SE = .04, p < .01) and supporting H3.4, there was a significant positive main effect of 
ratings importance on rating (β = .10, SE = .02, p < .01). The main effect of trust was not 
significant (β = .07, SE = .06, p = .25). As expected, the interaction between trust and 
ratings importance was also not significant (β = .01, SE = .04, p = .87). Finally, 




ratings importance (β =-.13, SE = .03, p < .01, d = .71) such that the effect of satisfaction 
on rating is weaker when a consumer feels that their individual rating is more important 
to the provider (see Figure 9). Further, the indirect effect of disconfirmation on ratings 
through satisfaction was significant for individuals who felt a relatively lower ratings 
importance (M-1SD = 5.09; βindirect = .19, 95% CI: .13, .25) or medium ratings 
importance (MMEAN = 6.07; βindirect = .12, 95% CI: .08, .17). As expected, the indirect 
effect was not significant for those who felt a higher ratings importance (M+1SD = 7.00; 
βindirect =.06, 95% CI: -.01, .12). 
 
 
Figure 9: The Effect of Satisfaction on Ratings at Different Levels of Ratings Importance 
 
Finally, the same analysis was conducted, but rater identification was the moderator. 
There was a significant positive main effect of disconfirmation on rating (β = .13, SE = 




.09, SE = .05, p = .05) and satisfaction on rating (β = .40, SE = .04, p < .01). However, 
the main effect of rater identification was not significant (β = .11, SE = .50, p = .83). As 
expected, the interaction between trust and rater identification was also not significant (β 
= .15, SE = .10, p = .13). Supporting H3.3, there was a significant negative interaction 
between satisfaction and rater identification (β =-.17, SE = .06, p < .01, d = .25) such that 
the effect of satisfaction on rating is weaker when a consumer feels that their rating will 
be individually identifiable (see Figure 10). The indirect effect of expectancy 
disconfirmation on ratings through satisfaction was significant in both conditions, but the 
effect size was larger in the anonymous (βindirectanonymous = .21, 95% CI: .13, .29) 
compared to individual condition (βindirectindividual = .12, 95% CI: .06, .19).  
 
 
 Panel A: Effect of Trust on Ratings    Panel B: Effect of Satisfaction on Ratings 
 
Figure 10: Moderating Effects of Anonymous vs. Identified Rater Conditions on the 





7.2.3 Tests of Post Hoc Hypotheses from Study 2B 
 
Finally, the post hoc hypotheses from Study 2B (H3.5 and H3.6) were tested. In Study 2B, 
results of a subsequent analysis suggested that trust may lead to satisfaction, and that the 
relationship is stronger when perceived risk is high. To test these hypotheses, I conducted 
a multiple moderated mediation analysis (PROCESS model 21; Hayes 2018). Expectancy 
disconfirmation was the predictor, trust was the mediator, and satisfaction was the 
dependent variable. Uncertainty was the first moderator, and perceived risk was the 
second moderator. As expected, there was a significant positive main effect of 
expectancy disconfirmation on trust (β = .28, SE = .03, p < .01), and a negative main 
effect of uncertainty on trust (β = -.07, SE = .03, p = .03). As expected, there was also a 
significant positive interaction between expectancy disconfirmation and uncertainty (β = 
.06, SE = .02, p = .01, d = .31) such that the effect of expectancy disconfirmation on trust 
was stronger when uncertainty was higher. Further, as expected, there was a significant 
positive main effect of expectancy disconfirmation on satisfaction (β = .34, SE = .03, p < 
.01) and the main effect of perceived risk on satisfaction was not significant (β = -.01, SE 
= .02, p = .56). Supporting H3.5, there was a positive main effect of trust on satisfaction (β 
= .65, SE = .06, p < .01). However, the predicted interaction between trust and perceived 
risk on satisfaction was not significant (β = .04, SE = .02, p = .12). Future research should 







Study 3 provides support that contextual network-related factors in peer-to-peer 
exchanges affect the relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and ratings. 
Ratings importance and the need to justify ratings (which were shown in the Pretest 
Study to be higher in peer-to-peer services), decrease the importance of satisfaction at the 
expense of trust (supporting P6a). Performance that merely meets (rather than exceeds) 
expectations generates only moderate levels of satisfaction. But peer-to-peer consumers 
will give high ratings to providers even if expectations are merely met. This is because 
although consumers may not be fully satisfied, providers have demonstrated that they can 
be trusted. Thus it would be difficult to justify giving a lower rating. Indeed, I had 
expected that need to justify would not affect trust, but the results showed that when need 
to justify is higher, the effect on trust on rating is actually stronger, while the effect of 
satisfaction is weaker. Further, the results showed that ratings importance creates an 
additional bias through a direct positive effect on peer-to-peer ratings (supporting P6b). 
Higher levels of perceived importance lead to higher ratings, likely because consumers 
don’t want to harm providers from future business.  
 
Study 3 also provides a possible solution to help attenuate the positive bias. Average 
ratings were lower if consumers felt that their rating was anonymous. This is because 
consumers in the anonymous (vs. individual) condition felt that their ratings were 
relatively less important to the peer provider. For these consumers, satisfaction was more 
strongly related to ratings, which further suggests that these ratings were less biased. 
Some platforms already attempt to anonymize ratings, but platforms could do more to 




able to respond with retribution. I had also expected that ratings would be considered to 
be relatively less important in the private (vs. public) condition, but there were no 
significant differences. This result might be because participants in the private condition 
knew that both the provider and RVezy would see the rating. RVezy could therefore use 
the rating for evaluative purposes, and hence the rating would still be important to the 
provider’s future business. Participants may have also thought that the rating would 
eventually be placed on the RVezy website, because they likely saw ratings from other 
customers on the website when they were booking their rental. 
 
Study 3 demonstrated that even when expectations are merely met, they may lead to 
higher ratings for peer-to-peer services. The remaining studies attempt to show that 
consumers of peer-to-peer services may give positive ratings even when expectations are 
negatively disconfirmed. Study 4 will manipulate provider control to determine its effect 
on perceptions of integrity, while Study 5 will manipulate provider causality to determine 
its effect on perceptions of reliability. The studies will further test how social norms of 
gratitude and empathy in peer-to-peer services weaken the effect of reliability, but not 
integrity, on ratings when expectations are negatively disconfirmed. 
          
8 Study 4 
 
From the previous studies, expectancy disconfirmation is related to trust, which leads to 
ratings for peer providers. Trust assessments are comprised of perceptions of reliability 




level) and integrity (i.e., confidence that the provider will honour their commitments 
fairly). However, in the case of negative disconfirmation, performance failure may not 
always lead to strong feelings about a provider’s unreliability or lack of integrity. Study 4 
explores the relationship between negative disconfirmation and integrity. It tests the 
proposition that negative disconfirmation leads to perceptions about a provider’s lack of 
integrity only if the consumer believes that the provider could have controlled the 
negative outcome (P8). If true, this could contribute to higher ratings in peer-to-peer 
services because some factors that would be controllable for commercial providers may 
be considered uncontrollable for peer providers. Peer providers are not professionals, and 
may not have the experience, ability, or financial resources to deliver expected service 
levels. If a consumer feels that a missed expectation is out of the provider’s control, they 
may consider the provider to be unreliable, but not without integrity. The provider put 
forth their best effort in good faith (though nonetheless delivered unsatisfactory service).  
 
Study 4 was also designed to test propositions P9a and P9b. I propose that social norms of 
gratitude and empathy contribute to ratings bias in peer-to-peer services because they 
motivate consumers to post higher ratings than may otherwise be deserved (i.e., P9a). 
Gratitude and empathy may cause consumers to forgive providers for being unreliable but 
not if the provider lacks integrity (P9b). If a provider places their own interest above the 
consumer’s interest, it breaks the social exchange. Thus, consumers who determine that a 
provider lacks integrity should feel a desire to punish them with lower ratings. I 
manipulate provider control to determine whether this leads to lower perceptions of 




11 shows the model to be tested in Study 4. 
 
Table 11: Study 4 Hypotheses 
  
  
4.1 Negative disconfirmation is negatively related to perceptions of provider integrity 
  
4.2 Negative disconfirmation is negatively related to perceptions of provider reliability 
  
4.3 Provider control moderates the relationship between negative disconfirmation and 
integrity; this relationship will be stronger when provider control is higher 
  
4.4  Social norms are positively related to ratings. 
  
4.5 When expectations are negatively disconfirmed, social norms moderate the 
relationship between reliability and ratings; this relationship will be weaker when 








8.1.1 Participants & Design 
 




a similar design to Study 1. While waiting to participate in an unrelated study, 
participants were intercepted by a confederate standing by a table with a tray of chocolate 
chip cookies. The confederate asked the participants if they would like to sample a 
chocolate chip cookie, and to take part in a survey about a new food service called Home 
Café that had recently been approved by the university. Two hundred and twenty-six 
undergraduate students agreed to participate in the survey. One participant was removed 
because they suspected that Home Café was not real and was part of a research study. 
The final sample included 225 participants. 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (Service Type: 
commercial vs. peer-to-peer) x 3 (Controllability: controllable vs. uncontrollable vs. 
ambiguous) between-subjects design. The confederate described the Home Café service 
to the participants, and explained that the service was sampling some food items to get 
initial feedback and ratings for its website that would be launching to the public later that 
month. In the commercial conditions, Home Café was described as a new food service 
that prepared and sold home-style meals and snacks to busy students. The confederate 
described herself as a student employee of Home Café and was wearing a t-shirt with a 
Home Café logo. In the peer-to-peer conditions, Home Café was described as a new 
peer-to-peer food service that “works sort of like an Uber or an Airbnb for food. 
Individual students who like to cook can join the service and sell our home-style meals 
and snacks to other busy students”. The confederate described herself as a student peer 





The confederate told participants that she would be sampling chocolate chip cookies, and 
that the confederate had personally baked the cookies as an employee of Home Café (or 
peer provider for Home Café). The confederate gestured toward a laptop computer on 
which appeared a webpage for the Home Café website (see Appendix M). The webpage 
was created using the Wix.com website builder. Although the webpage was fictional, it 
was designed to deceive participants into believing that it was a real website. A photo of 
the confederate appeared on the website, along with a picture of the chocolate chip 
cookies, a product name and product description, and an ingredient list. In the 
commercial conditions, participants were told that the website allows customers to see 
which Home Café staff member prepared their home-style meal or snack. In the peer-to-
peer conditions, participants were told that the website allows customers to see the 
different meals offered by the peer providers, and that the product descriptions for each 
item were written by the individual peer provider.  
 
Participants read the product description and then were given one chocolate chip cookie 
to sample. To elicit negative disconfirmation, the cookies were left out for a few days 
prior to the study so that they would be somewhat hard, dry, and stale when they were 
sampled. In the controllable conditions, the product name on the website was “Melt-in-
your-mouth” cookies. The product description further promised that the cookies were 
yummy and moist, and that they were “ooey and gooey and melt-in-your-mouth”. 
Because the cookies had been left to harden and stale, this description should not have 
matched the actual product experience. I expected that participants should infer that the 




should feel that the issue was controllable, especially in the peer-to-peer condition 
because the provider wrote the product description herself.  
 
In the uncontrollable conditions, the product name and description was the same as in the 
controllable conditions, but the confederate mentioned that the university had told her 
that the research was being conducted earlier in the week. The confederate said that she 
baked the cookies for the original date, and so they may no longer be as fresh. In this 
case, the negative disconfirmation should be considered uncontrollable because it was 
caused by the university rather than the provider. In the ambiguous conditions, the 
product name was “Ultimate” cookies. The description further promised that the cookies 
were “sweet and satisfying, with chocolate chips in every bite”. This product name and 
description did not reference the cookie texture. I expected that the staleness of the cookie 
should still lead to negative disconfirmation, but that it would not be clear whether the 
provider controlled the outcome. Perhaps the missed expectations were simply a matter of 
personal taste, or in the peer-to-peer conditions, perhaps the peer provider was simply not 
qualified or experienced enough to know that the cookies were too hard.  
 
After sampling the cookie, participants were directed by the confederate to scan a QR 
code to activate an online survey from Home Café on their mobile phones. On the survey, 
participants were first asked to provide a rating for their experience on a five-star scale. 
They were told that this rating would be posted to the Home Café website. Participants 
next rated expectancy disconfirmation on a five-point scale. If a participant indicated that 




then asked to indicate how strongly they felt that the negative experience was controllable 
by the provider. Specifically, provider control was a three-item measure (α = .92): “My 
poor Home Café experience was definitely controllable by my provider,” “My poor 
Home Café experience was definitely preventable by my provider,”  “My poor Home 
Café experience was definitely avoidable by my provider” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = 
Strongly Agree). Finally, participants indicated their satisfaction (1 item), trust (four 




I expected that perceived provider control would be significantly higher in the 
controllable condition than the other two conditions, and that it would be lowest in the 
uncontrollable condition. I further expected that provider control should affect the 
participant’s feelings about the provider’s integrity as per H4.3, such that integrity was 
lowest in the controllable condition. For reliability, I expected that it would be similarly 
low in the controllable and the ambiguous condition. In the ambiguous condition, 
although it is not clear whether the provider intended to deceive (because the product 
description did not describe the cookie dishonestly), the staleness of the cookie should 
nevertheless cause participants to feel that the provider is unreliable.  
 
Unfortunately, the study failed to elicit sufficient levels of negative disconfirmation 
despite the fact that the cookie was left out to get stale. Only 5 participants (2.2%) 




controllable condition, and one was in the uncontrollable condition. Thus it was not 
possible to assess the effectiveness of the controllability manipulation. It was also not 
possible to test proposition P8 or P9b because they specifically refer to the effects of 
negative disconfirmation. The specific hypotheses related to these propositions (H4.1, H4.2, 
H4.3, and H4.5) will instead be tested in Study 5.  
 
The Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Study 4 are in Appendix N. 
Descriptive statistics by condition are in Table 12. Comparisons between the variables of 
interest were tested with ANOVA. There were no significant differences between the 
peer-to-peer and commercial conditions for any of the measured variables. However, 
planned contrasts between the controllability conditions revealed some differences. 
Satisfaction was significantly lower in the controllable condition (M = 5.77) compared to 
the ambiguous condition (M = 6.21, t(203) = -2.07, p < .05) and marginally lower in the 
controllable condition compared to the two other conditions combined (t(203) = -1.91, p 
< .10). As expected, reliability did not significantly differ between the controllable 
condition (M = 4.47) and the ambiguous condition (M = 4.61, t(215) = -1.30, p = .20). I 
expected that reliability would be higher in the uncontrollable condition, but it did not 
differ between this condition (M = 4.54) and the other two conditions combined (t(215) = 
.04, p = .97). This is likely because the majority of participants (71%) indicated positive 
disconfirmation. Thus reliability was relatively high in all conditions. As expected, 
integrity was lower in the controllable condition compared to the other two conditions 





Table 12: Means and Standard Deviations for Study 4 
 
  Commercial Controllable                 
Commercial 
Uncontrollable                 
Commercial 
Ambiguous                
P2P 
Controllable                 
P2P 
Uncontrollable                 
P2P 
Ambiguous                
  N = 33 N = 35 N = 36 N = 46 N = 39 N = 36 
Rating   4.76 (.44)  4.74 (.51)  4.72 (.57)  4.70 (.55)  4.77 (.43)  4.78 (.42) 
Expectancy Disc.  3.97 (.81)  3.91 (.85)  4.22 (.76)  3.89 (.95)  3.95 (.86)  4.03 (.77) 
Provider Control  1.67     3.00 (1.52)   4.33  
Satisfaction  5.93 (1.18)  6.11 (1.13)  6.28 (.96)  5.67 (1.57)  5.92 (1.40)  6.13 (.86) 
Trust  4.27 (.88)  4.66 (.50)  4.61 (.56)  4.54 (.65)  4.45 (.49)  4.54 (.56) 
Reliability  4.33 (.89)  4.67 (.51  4.63 (.61)  4.56 (.67)  4.42 (.64)  4.59 (.53) 
Integrity  4.22 (.97)  4.64 (.54)  4.60 (.57)  4.51 (.72)  4.49 (.53)  4.50 (.54) 
Social Norms  3.53 (.92)  3.98 (.80)  3.99 (.92)  3.79 (.98)  3.71 (.72)  3.82 (.79) 
 
Next, I tested for differences in social norms of gratitude and empathy between 
conditions. I expected that social norms would be higher in peer-to-peer services, but 
results showed that they did not significantly differ between the peer-to-peer and 
commercial conditions (MCommercial = 3.85, MPeer = 3.78, F = .36, p = .55). Social norms 
also did not significantly differ between the three controllability conditions, but they were 
marginally lower (t(207) = -1.96, p < .10) in the controllable commercial condition 
compared to the other five conditions combined. Finally, a linear regression tested H4.4. 









Although the cookies were left out over several days to become stale, the majority of 
participants enjoyed their consumption experience. Because the levels of negative 
disconfirmation were so low, it was not possible to test most of the hypotheses. These 
hypotheses will be tested in Study 5. In retrospect, it may have been necessary to add 
some aversive tasting ingredients to the cookie to elicit negative disconfirmation. I did 
not want to do this because it was so important that participants believed that they were 
taking part in a real food service sampling experience. I was concerned that if the 
cookie’s poor taste was too obvious, it would jeopardize the deception.  
 
The only hypothesis that could be tested in Study 4 was H4.4. This hypothesis was 
supported. Social norms were positively related to ratings. Thus, if social norms are 
higher in peer-to-peer services, they may contribute to the ratings bias. However, the 
results of this study showed that there was no significant difference in social norms for 
peer-to-peer compared to commercial conditions. In both the peer-to-peer and 
commercial conditions, the provider was described as a student, and it was made clear 
that the provider baked the cookies herself. Perhaps this level of personalization and 
personal connection engenders strong feelings of social norms even for employees of a 
commercial business. This may be another benefit of relationship marketing and personal 
selling that should be explored in future studies. Alternatively, there may be a difference 
between peer-to-peer services in which providers share their personal assets (homes, 
vehicles, tools, clothing etc.) and those in which they share their skills only. Consumers 
may have stronger feelings of gratitude and empathy when they are invited into a 




items. Those feelings may not be as strong for peer providers of skills-based services. 
This prediction should be explored in future studies. Finally, the relationship between 
social norms and ratings will be further tested in Study 5 to see if it still holds when a 
consumer experiences negative disconfirmation.  
 
9 Study 5 
 
Study 5 tests propositions P7, P8, P9a, and P9b. The main objective of Study 5 is to test the 
relationship between negative disconfirmation and reliability, and to explore how it is 
affected by clarity of standards and assessments of causal attribution (P7). I predict that 
when standards of evaluation are less clear, as they are in peer-to-peer services, 
consumers will more likely blame themselves (rather than their provider) for causing 
missed expectations. This leads to higher ratings through higher perceptions of provider 
reliability. I manipulate clarity of standards to determine whether this helps attenuate the 
positive bias for peer-to-peer ratings. 
 
Following from Study 4, this study also tests the proposition that negative 
disconfirmation leads to feelings that the provider lacks integrity only if they could have 
controlled the performance failure (P8). Finally, I test how social norms of gratitude and 
empathy differentially affect the relationship of reliability and integrity with ratings (P9a 
and P9b.)  Table 13 lists the hypotheses to be tested in Study 5. Figure 12 shows the 





Table 13: Study 5 Hypotheses 
  
  
5.1  Clarity of standards is positively related to perceptions of provider causality 
  
5.2 Negative disconfirmation is negatively related to perceptions of provider reliability 
  
5.3 Negative disconfirmation is negatively related to perceptions of provider integrity 
  
5.4 Provider causality moderates the relationship between negative disconfirmation and 
reliability; this relationship will be stronger when provider causality is higher 
  
5.5 Provider control moderates the relationship between negative disconfirmation and 
integrity; this relationship will be stronger when provider control is higher 
  
5.6  Social norms of gratitude and empathy are positively related to ratings. 
  
5.7 When expectations are negatively disconfirmed, social norms moderate the 
relationship between reliability and ratings; this relationship will be weaker when 









Four hundred and one North American participants (211 women; Mage = 32.09 years) 




to one of four conditions in a 2 (Service Type: commercial vs. peer-to-peer) x 2 
(Standards: undefined vs. defined) between-subjects design. Participants read that they 
were planning a weekend trip to Seattle WA and needed to choose a mid-range 
accommodation for a 2-night stay. Participants reviewed two different accommodation 
listings on a fictional online booking site. Both of the options were listed for $109 per 
night and both were described as a standard mid-range accommodation (i.e., “neither 
basic nor premium”). The accommodation listings included a cover photo, a short 
description of the unit, and a list of the amenities (see Appendix O). In the commercial 
conditions, participants were told that the accommodations were listed on a website 
called HotelEasy.com. The website names and logos were fabricated to control for the 
fact that existing attitudes toward real brands could impact participant responses. 
Participants were told that HotelEasy.com was an online booking aggregator similar to 
Hotels.com or Booking.com, and the accommodations were offered from many different 
(unnamed) hotels. In the peer-to-peer conditions, participants were told that the 
accommodations were listed on a peer-to-peer home rental website called 
HomeEasy.com. Participants were told that the accommodations on HomeEasy.com were 
provided by individual homeowners, and that the platform was similar to Airbnb or 
HomeAway. Further, in the commercial conditions, the accommodation providers were 
listed as managers, and in the peer-to-peer conditions, the providers were listed as hosts.  
 
Participants selected one of the two accommodation options. They were thanked for their 
booking, and read about the accommodation standards on HotelEasy.com 




conditions, participants read that the company stood behind the quality of the 
accommodations listed on their website. In the defined standards conditions participants 
further read that the company asks all providers to adhere to the following standards: 1) 
accommodations should be extraordinarily well-kept, so that discerning guests can expect 
the rooms and amenities to be maintained in top condition; 2) accommodations should be 
thoroughly cleaned prior to rental, so that discerning guests can expect immaculate 
cleanliness; 3) accommodations should adhere to strict privacy, so that guests can relax 
without fear of undue noise or interruption. I expected that, compared to the undefined 
conditions, the standards of comparison in the defined standards conditions should be 
relatively more clear, and that this difference would be especially large for the peer-to-
peer conditions because standards are relatively less clear in peer-to-peer services than 
commercial services. Participants clicked forward to accept that they read the standards, 
and then indicated their expectations (1 item), perceived risk (1 item), and uncertainty 
(two items; α = .89). These variables were measured the same as in prior studies. The 
correlation between perceived risk and uncertainty was moderate (r = .31, p < .01). 
 
Next, participants read that they had arrived in Seattle and that they would be shown a 
series of photos that described their actual rental experience. Specifically, participants 
read that the photos represented what they saw when they walked around the rental 
accommodation. Participants were shown a total of 15 photos of their “experience” (see 
Appendix P). The photos advanced automatically after 5 seconds so that all participants 
spent the same amount of time viewing the images. The photos showed rooms and 




the walls, small cracks on the ceiling etc.). There was a photo of a coffeemaker with an 
“out of order sign”. The rooms looked relatively but not immaculately clean. There was a 
photo of a bathroom floor with a single hair on the ground. The collection of photos were 
pretested to give an overall impression of a mid-range accommodation that was 
moderately clean and well-kept, but not to the quality that one might expect.  
 
After viewing their rental experience, participants were asked to provide an online rating 
for the accommodation and its manager (host) on a five-star scale. Participants were told 
that the rating would be posted to the company website. Next, participants rated 
expectancy disconfirmation (1 item), satisfaction (1 item), and trust (four items; α = .94), 
which were measured the same as in previous studies. Participants who indicated that 
they experienced negative disconfirmation were then asked the provider causality (four 
items; α = .73) and provider control (three items; α = .89) questions to determine 
attribution.  
 
All participants then rated the accommodation on several attributes based on how they 
compared to what the participant would expect from a standard mid-tier accommodation. 
The attributes were measured on seven-point semantic differential scales: overall quality 
(“Very LOW quality/Very HIGH quality”), cleanliness (“Very CLEAN/Very DIRTY”), 
and condition (“Very POOR condition/Very GOOD condition”). Participants then 
responded to clarity of standards measure which was rated on a seven-point semantic 
differential scale. Specifically, participants were asked “How clear are you about the 




tier hotel (home) accommodation?” (“Not at all clear on the service standards/Completely 
clear on the service standards”). Finally, to measure social norms (6 items; α = .93), 
participants were asked “if you were actually renting this accommodation, to what extent 
would you feel the following emotions?”: grateful, appreciative, sympathetic, warm, 




9.2.1 Differences Between Conditions 
 
The Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Study 5 are in Appendix Q. 
Descriptive statistics by condition are in Table 14. As expected, expectations did not 
significantly differ between the peer-to-peer and commercial conditions (MPeer = 5.62, 
MCommercial = 5.67, F(1, 399) = .34, p = .56). However, expectations were higher in the 
defined standards (M= 5.76) compared to the undefined standards conditions (M = 5.52, 
F(1, 399) = 7.54, p < .01). Planned contrasts revealed that this difference was significant 
in the commercial conditions (MDefined = 5.85, MUndefined = 5.48, t(397) = -3.00, p < .01) 
but not in the peer-to-peer conditions (MDefined = 5.67, MUndefined = 5.56, t(397) = -.89, p = 
.38). Thus, the changes I expected to see in the ratings between the peer-to-peer 
conditions were not affected by differences in expectations. Also as expected, perceived 
risk was significantly higher for the peer-to-peer conditions compared to commercial 
conditions (MPeer = 3.32, MCommercial = 2.86, F(1, 399) = 13.47, p < .01), and uncertainty 
was marginally higher for the peer-to-peer conditions compared to commercial conditions 





Next, the variables of interest were compared between conditions. The stimuli 
successfully elicited negative disconfirmation without eliciting a large proportion of 
extremely negative opinions. Overall, 76.3% of participants experienced negative 
disconfirmation (i.e., 1, 2 or 3 on the seven-point scale) after viewing the accommodation 
photos. Of those who experienced negative disconfirmation, only 13.2% said that the 
experience was “much worse” than they expected. A total of 18% of participants 
experienced confirmed expectations, while 5.3% felt that the accommodation experience 
was better than they expected.  
 
As expected, ratings were significantly higher for the peer-to-peer compared to the 
commercial conditions (MPeer = 3.32, MCommercial = 2.86, F(1, 399) = 13.47, p < .01). 
Planned contrasts revealed that, as expected, ratings were higher for the undefined peer-
to-peer (M = 3.24) compared to the undefined hotel condition (M = 2.90, t(397) = 2.72, p 
< .01), and were not significantly different between the defined peer-to-peer (M = 3.05) 
compared to the defined hotel condition (M = 2.91, t(397) = 1.12, p = .27). This supports 
my prediction that implementing defined standards for peer-to-peer accommodations 
reduces positive bias compared to commercial accommodations. I expected that the mean 
rating in the undefined peer-to-peer condition would also be higher than in the defined 
peer-to-peer condition, but this difference was not significant (t(397) = 1.52, p = .13). 
Expectancy disconfirmation was significantly higher for the peer-to-peer compared to the 
commercial conditions (MPeer = 2.93, MCommercial = 2.63, F(1, 399) = 6.65, p < .05). This 




Contrast tests revealed that, compared to all of the other conditions, the undefined peer-
to-peer condition had significantly higher disconfirmation (t(397) = 2.25, p < .05).  
 
Table 14: Means and Standard Deviations for Study 5 
 







  N = 100 N = 100 N = 100 N = 101 
Expectations 5.56 (.93) 5.48 (.82) 5.67 (.94) 5.85 (.82) 
Perceived Risk 3.25 (1.34) 2.84 (1.21) 3.39 (1.26) 2.87 (1.26) 
Uncertainty 2.66 (.96) 2.51 (1.00) 2.62 (.87) 2.45 (.90) 
          
Rating 3.24 (.90) 2.90 (.86) 3.05 (.97) 2.91 (.80) 
Expectancy Disc. 3.00 (1.16) 2.61 (1.11) 2.85 (1.24) 2.65 (1.03) 
Provider Causality 4.92 (1.02) 5.06 (1.11) 4.93 (1.12) 5.38 (1.13) 
Provider Control 5.81 (1.08) 5.36 (1.31) 5.81 (.85) 5.34 (1.25) 
Satisfaction 3.96 (1.63) 3.37 (1.50) 3.63 (1.56) 3.22 (1.38) 
Trust 3.92 (1.29) 3.60 (1.21) 3.97 (1.27) 3.63 (1.18) 
Reliability 3.96 (1.32) 3.60 (1.29) 4.01 (1.34) 3.59 (1.23) 
Integrity 3.88 (1.34) 3.61 (1.25) 3.92 (1.26) 3.66 (1.21) 
Quality 3.84 (1.38) 3.22 (1.25) 3.56 (1.32) 3.15 (1.16) 
Cleanliness 3.75 (1.60) 3.23 (1.36) 3.49 (1.42) 3.33 (1.33) 
Condition 3.87 (1.45) 3.06 (1.24) 3.69 (1.35) 3.14 (1.21) 
     
Social Norms  2.10 (.89) 1.82 (.78) 2.26 (.99) 1.84 (.79) 
Clarity of Standards  4.63 (1.47) 4.90 (1.41) 5.01 (1.34) 4.98 (1.54) 
 
Next, I compared social norms, clarity of standards, and provider causality between 
conditions. I expected that social norms of gratitude and empathy would be higher in 




peer compared to the commercial conditions (MPeer = 2.18, MCommercial = 1.83, F(1, 398) = 
16.86, p < .01). Next, I expected that clarity of standards would be lower in the peer-to-
peer compared to commercial conditions, and higher in the defined compared to 
undefined standards conditions. I further expected that the differences between the 
defined and undefined conditions would be significant only for peer-to-peer services 
because standards should be relatively clear for commercial accommodations even if they 
are undefined. Clarity of standards did not significantly differ between the peer-to-peer 
(M = 4.82) and commercial conditions (M = 4.94, F(1, 398) = .70, p = .40) or between 
the defined and undefined standards conditions (MDefined= 5.00, MUndefined = 4.76, F(1, 
398) = 2.53, p = .11). However, planned contrasts revealed that, as expected, standards 
were more clear in the defined peer-to-peer conditions (M = 5.01) compared to the 
undefined peer-to-peer conditions (M = 4.63, t(396) = -1.86, p < .10; i.e., marginal 
significance) while they did not differ between the defined hotel conditions (M = 4.98) 
and the undefined hotel conditions (M = 4.90, t(396) = .15, p = .88). Providing some 
support for my predictions, the standards of evaluation were significantly less clear in the 
undefined peer-to-peer condition compared to all other conditions combined (t(396) = -
2.00, p < .05).  
 
Next, I expected that provider causality would be lower in the peer-to-peer compared to 
the commercial conditions, and higher in the defined compared to undefined standards 
conditions because of the expected differences in the clarity of standards. As expected, 
provider causality was significantly lower in the peer-to-peer (M = 4.92) compared to the 




did not significantly differ between the defined and undefined standards conditions 
(MDefined= 5.16, MUndefined = 5.00, F(1, 398) = 1.75, p = .19).  
 
9.2.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
 
Next, the hypotheses were tested. Hypothesis H5.1 was tested with linear regression. 
Supporting H5.1, there was a significant positive relationship between clarity of standards 
and provider causality (β = .16, SE = .04, p < .01) such that provider causality is 
considered to be stronger when standards of evaluation are more clear. The remaining 
hypotheses were tested using only the data from participants who experienced negative 
disconfirmation (N = 305). With linear regression, I first tested the relationship between 
negative disconfirmation and the two dimensions of trust: reliability and integrity. 
Supporting H5.2 there was a significant negative effect of negative disconfirmation on 
reliability (β = -.73, SE = .08, p < .01) such that as negative disconfirmation becomes 
stronger (i.e., as expectancy disconfirmation becomes lower, from 3 to 2 to 1), perceived 
provider reliability is lower. Supporting H5.3 there was a significant negative effect of 
negative disconfirmation on integrity (β = -.72, SE = .08, p < .01). As negative 
disconfirmation becomes lower, perceived provider integrity is lower. 
 
Hypothesis H5.4 predicted that provider causality strengthens the effect of negative 
disconfirmation on reliability. I conducted a moderation analysis with negative 
disconfirmation as the predictor, reliability as the dependent variable, and provider 




a significant negative relationship between negative disconfirmation and reliability (β = -
.62, SE = .07, p < .01) such that as disconfirmation becomes more negative, reliability is 
similarly lower. Further, there was a significant negative main effect of provider causality 
on reliability, such that if consumers believe that providers have caused performance 
failure, then reliability will be lower (β = -.28, SE = .05, p < .01). However, the predicted 
interaction was not significant (β = .00, SE = .06, p = .98). Therefore H5.4 was not 
supported, but the overall premise was confirmed; when performance is below 
expectations, a stronger feeling of provider causality leads to lower perceptions of 
provider reliability. 
 
Hypothesis H5.5 predicted that provider control strengthens the effect of negative 
disconfirmation on integrity. From a moderation analysis, there was a significant negative 
relationship between negative disconfirmation and integrity (which supports H5.3; β = -
.39, SE = .08, p < .01) such that as disconfirmation becomes more negative, integrity is 
lower. Additionally, there was a significant negative main effect of provider control on 
integrity, such that if consumers believe that providers have more control over the 
performance failure, then integrity will be lower (β = -.37, SE = .05, p < .01). Further, 
supporting H5.5, there was a significant interaction (β = -.29, SE = .08, p < .01). The more 
that consumers feel that their provider had control over a performance failure, the 
stronger is the negative effect from negative disconfirmation on integrity (see Figure 13). 
An analysis of conditional effects revealed that the negative effect of negative 
disconfirmation on integrity is significant if provider control is higher (M+1SD = 6.80; β = 




disconfirmation does not lead to lower perceptions of integrity if consumers feel that the 
providers had lower control over the performance failure (M-1SD = 4.67; β = -.13, SE = 
.12, p = .25). Further, a Johnson-Neyman analysis showed that the negative effect of 
negative disconfirmation on integrity was significant only when provider control was at a 
value of 4.91 (out of 7) or higher (approximately 79% of participants). Conversely, if 
participants believe that provider control is relatively low, then negative disconfirmation 
does not affect their perceptions of the provider’s integrity. 
 
 
Figure 13: The Effect of Negative Disconfirmation on Integrity at Different Levels of 
Perceived Provider Control 
. 
 
Finally, H5.6 and H5.7 were tested. I expected that social norms of gratitude and empathy 
would add to ratings bias by motivating consumers to give higher ratings to their 
providers. Further, I expected that consumers would forgive providers for unreliable 




between negative disconfirmation and unreliability, such that the effect of unreliability on 
ratings is weaker. Social norms should not affect the relationship between integrity and 
ratings, because consumers should feel justified giving a low rating to a provider if they 
feel that they lacked integrity. From a moderation analysis (see Figure 14) there was a 
significant positive main effect of reliability on ratings (β =.18, SE = .04, p < .01). 
Supporting H5.6, there was a significant positive main effect of social norms on ratings (β 
= .46, SE = .06, p < .01). Finally, supporting H5.7, there was a significant negative 
interaction (β = -.10, SE = .04, p < .05, d = .28). When expectations are negatively 
disconfirmed, the effect of reliability on ratings is weaker when social norms are higher. 
Further, a Johnson-Neyman analysis showed that (when expectations are negatively 
disconfirmed), reliability affects ratings only when social norms are at a value of 2.59 
(out of 7) or lower (approximately 84% of participants).To show that social norms 
affected only reliability and not integrity, a moderation analysis was conducted with 
integrity as the predictor in place of reliability. As expected, the interaction between 
integrity and social norms on ratings was not significant (β = .06, SE = .04, p = .18). Thus 
social norms do not weaken the effect of a lack of integrity on ratings. 
 
 






Study 5 successfully elicited sufficient levels of negative disconfirmation from 
participants. This allowed me to test all of the hypotheses. As expected, negative 
disconfirmation leads to feelings that providers are unreliable. Providers are considered to 
be especially unreliable if they are believed to have caused a consumer’s missed 
expectations. Negative disconfirmation also leads to feelings that a provider lacks 
integrity, but not if consumers feel that providers had relatively low control over the 
performance failure. Further, as expected, gratitude and empathy cause consumers to 
forgive providers for unreliable service. This leads to higher ratings even when 
expectations are negatively disconfirmed, which contributes to the positive ratings bias. 
However, gratitude and empathy do not affect the relationship between integrity and 
ratings. If a consumer feels that a provider lacks integrity, it should lead to low ratings 
because providers have shown that they place their own interests above those of the 
consumer. Leveraging these findings, Study 6 will test a novel ratings system to 
determine whether it will help to attenuate the positive ratings bias by increasing 
perceived provider control.  
 
Study 5 also demonstrated that evaluation standards are less clear in peer-to-peer 
services, leading to lower perceptions of provider causality for performance failures in 
peer-to-peer services compared to commercial services. Peer-to-peer platforms can 
attenuate the positive ratings bias by helping consumers to better understand how to 
evaluate peer-to-peer services. This can be done by introducing defined standards for 




expectations for peer-to-peer consumers, but rather, they simply made the standards of 
evaluation more clear. Study 5 demonstrated that when standards of evaluation in peer-to-
peer services are clearly defined, the difference in ratings between peer-to-peer and 
commercial services is removed.  
 
 
10 Study 6 
 
 
Studies 1 to 5 demonstrated that consumers of peer-to-peer services evaluate service 
experiences based in part on whether they trust their provider. Trustworthy providers 
honour their commitments and meet consumers’ expectations. If expectations are met, 
even if the experience is not completely satisfying, consumers may give providers a high 
rating, signaling trustworthiness. When expectations are disconfirmed, consumers may 
only feel able to justify giving a low rating if they believe that a provider caused the 
missed expectations and also had control over the outcome. In this case, the provider 
could have prevented the issue, but did not; thus it can be determined that the provider 
lacks integrity. A lack of integrity negates the positive effects of gratitude and empathy, 
and should lead to low ratings for peer providers. 
 
Leveraging these learnings, the objective of Study 6 is to test a novel ratings system that 
would attenuate the positivity bias by increasing a provider’s perceived controllability. In 
many peer-to-peer platforms, consumers are asked to rate providers on a variety of 
attributes. For example, Airbnb asks consumers to rate providers on communication, 




themselves on these or other attributes. The provider-authored ratings act as an implicit 
service commitment by providers for each attribute, and consumers would draw on those 
ratings to help make purchase decisions. For example, an Airbnb consumer in the new 
system may decide to purchase from a provider after learning that the provider rated 
themselves and their property at 5-stars for cleanliness, 5-stars for communication and 4-
stars for location.  
 
Provider-authored ratings reduce information asymmetry, because providers have 
complete information about their quality. Provider-authored ratings thus give consumers 
a clear standard against which they can set their expectations. This is because providers 
have the ability and are expected to rate their attributes fairly and accurately. If actual 
performance is lower than the provider-authored ratings, the issue should be assumed to 
be controllable by the provider. Consumers should feel that the provider intended to 
deceive by giving artificially high ratings that were not commensurate with their actual 
performance level.  
 
If a provider explicitly communicates that a consumer can expect a certain level of 
cleanliness (for example) but does not deliver it, it implies intentionality. This may be 
especially true for providers that rate themselves at five-stars, because five-star ratings 
mean that the service level should be perfect, or could not be higher. It is not difficult to 
evaluate whether performance was or was not perfect. If a provider fails to match this 
performance expectation, the consumer should feel that the provider was not honest in 




transaction. When consumers feel that they were treated unfairly, and that the provider 
lacks integrity, they should feel justified to rate the provider poorly. In turn, this should 
help to attenuate the positive ratings bias. On the other hand, if a provider rates 
themselves at four-stars for a particular attribute, but delivers something less, consumers 
may feel that the provider was relatively honest. Thus the effect of provider-authored 
ratings should be reduced. Table 15 presents the hypotheses to be tested in Study 6. 
 
Table 15: Study 6 Hypotheses 
  
  
   6.1 Compared to consumer-authored ratings, provider-authored ratings lead to higher 
perceived provider control 
  
   6.2 The rating score moderates the relationship between provider-authored ratings and 
provider control; this relationship is stronger when the rating score is five-stars 
  
   6.3 When the rating score is five-stars, provider-authored ratings lead to lower 
perceptions of provider integrity compared to when ratings are consumer-authored 
  
   6.4 When the rating score is five-stars, provider-authored ratings lead to lower post-





10.1.1 Participants & Design 
 
Two hundred undergraduate students (120 women; Mage = 18.22) were recruited for 
course credit (80 women; Mage = 19.85 years). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions in a 2 (Rating Score: Five-star vs. Mixed) x 2 (Rating Author: 




study was completed in two phases and followed a similar design to studies 2A and 2B. 
In the first phase, participants received an email from the lab manager with the study 
instructions. The email stated that the university was considering hiring a graphic design 
company (“Netwrk”) to provide design services for students, and that the purpose of the 
study was to test the company’s services for logo design. Participants were provided with 
a link to the first of two surveys.  
 
After clicking to begin the survey, participants were asked to review the digital profiles of 
three freelance graphic designers who were using the Netwrk platform (see Appendix R), 
and to choose one of those designers to work on their logo project. Each profile contained 
a photo of the designer, a short description about their creative interests and design 
experience, and a set of ratings for four different attributes: 1) originality, 2) level of 
customization, 3) attention to detail, and 4) speed. Each of the attributes had been rated 
on a five-star scale. In the five-star ratings conditions each of the four attributes (i.e., 
originality, level of customization, attention to detail, and speed) were rated at 5-stars 
(i.e., a perfect rating) for all three of the graphic designers. In the mixed ratings 
conditions, three of four attributes were rated at 4-stars and the fourth was rated at 5-stars. 
I expected that, compared to the five-star ratings conditions, the mixed ratings would set 
relatively lower quality expectations, and might be considered to be more accurate and 
honest.  
 
In the consumer-authored ratings conditions, the text “Consumers rate my services as” 




that the attribute ratings represented an aggregate score of the ratings provided by 
previous consumers who had worked with each particular designer. Participants were 
reminded that ratings from previous consumers help new consumers understand the 
quality and service that they can expect from the designer. In the provider-authored 
ratings conditions, the text “I rate my services as” was placed above the attribute ratings. 
Participants were told that the ratings for the attributes were given by the provider 
themselves, to help consumers understand the quality and service that they can expect 
from the designer. I expected that, compared to the consumer-authored ratings conditions, 
participants who experienced negative disconfirmation in the provider-authored ratings 
conditions would assess provider control higher. This is because the provider set the 
participant’s expectations by giving the ratings himself. I also included a control 
condition in which the online listings for the designers did not include any ratings. This 
was to control for the anchoring effect of prior ratings. It also allowed me to determine a 
more accurate evaluation of designer performance which I could then compare to the 
final evaluations in the other conditions to calculate an estimate of ratings bias.  
 
Participants chose one of the three designers. I created a dummy variable to identify 
which designer was chosen by each participant (0 = No, 1 = Yes). These variables were 
used as covariates in the analyses. Next, participants were asked about their feelings 
about the upcoming experience including their expectations (1 item), perceived risk (1 
item), and uncertainty (two items; α = .71), which were measured the same as in previous 
studies. The correlation between perceived risk and uncertainty was moderate (r = .40, p 




significantly affect the participants’ feelings about the provider prior to the experience, 
and to ensure that any differences in expectancy disconfirmation and ratings were not due 
to differences in expectations, risk or uncertainty. Finally, participants provided their 
email address and were told that their chosen Netwrk designer would contact them via 
email later that day to begin the design process.  
 
The second phase of the study began approximately one hour after the participant had 
completed the first survey. Posing as the chosen Netwrk designer, I sent an email to the 
participant to start the design process. The designer introduced himself and explained that 
he needed some information from the participant: their first and last name along with a 
key phrase or motto to include in the design; some direction on the style of logo that they 
wanted including whether they preferred it to be colourful or neutral, and clean/simple or 
detailed/artistic; and to highlight their interests from a list of choices including sports, 
music, art and business, which would help the designer determine a theme for the logo. 
Participants were also asked to provide additional background information that could be 
used to customize the design. The answers to the style and interest questions were used to 
select one of six logo design templates that would be used for the new design. I created a 
dummy variable to identify which template was given to each participant (0 = No, 1 = 
Yes). These variables were used as covariates in the analyses.  
 
Participants responded to the email and provided the requested information. They 
received a thank you reply from the designer and were told that the designer would 




participants received a third email from the designer with the new logo. As in Studies 2A 
and 2B, the email was delivered approximately one hour after the end of the 24-hour 
window, thus failing to meet the service commitment. The designer apologized, and 
stated that he was delayed because he was working on another project. I expected that 
this would help to elicit negative disconfirmation, and specifically, that it would impact 
the evaluation of the “speed” attribute. To further elicit negative disconfirmation I 
misspelled one word in each participant’s life motto (see Appendix S for examples) and 
expected that this would impact the participants’ assessment of the “attention to detail” 
attribute. Finally, to get a range of evaluations for the “originality” and “level of 
customization” attributes, I ignored the additional background information that 
participants provided, and did not use it to customize the logo in any way.  
 
The email also included a link to the second survey, on which participants could evaluate 
the service experience. First, participants were asked to provide a rating on a 5-star scale. 
They were told that the rating would be assigned to the designer, and would be shared 
with Netwrk so that they could post it on their website. Next, participants were reminded 
of the ratings scores that previous consumers (or the provider himself) gave the designer 
for each of the four attributes. With these in mind, participants were asked to rate the 
designer on a 5-star scale for each of originality, customization, detail, and speed. I 
aggregated the scores on these four items to create a new variable called attribute ratings. 
Participants next indicated expectancy disconfirmation (1 item) which was measured the 
same as in previous studies. For participants who indicated that they experienced negative 




items; α = .90.). Finally, satisfaction (1 item), and trust (including the four items 
representing the dimensions of reliability and integrity; α = .91) were measured the same 




10.2.1 Differences Between Conditions 
 
The Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Study 6 are in Appendix T. 
Descriptive statistics by condition are in Table 16. The variables of interest were 
compared between conditions with ANCOVA. As expected, the manipulations of the 
factors had no significant effect on expectations, perceived risk, and uncertainty. These 
variables did not significantly differ between any of the conditions. Disconfirmation was 
significantly higher in the five-star ratings conditions (M = 4.85) compared to the mixed 
ratings conditions (M = 4.24, F(1, 151) = 7.19, p < .01) and also in the five-star ratings 
conditions compared to the control condition (M = 3.73, F(1, 111) = 14.63, p < .01). This 
suggests that participants’ evaluations after the experience may have been positively 
influenced by the high ratings that they saw before their experience. Relatedly, 
satisfaction was marginally higher in the five-star ratings conditions (M = 5.44) compared 
to the mixed ratings conditions (M = 5.03, F(1, 151) = 3.41, p < .10) and was 
significantly higher in the five-star ratings conditions compared to the control condition 
(M = 4.40, F(1, 111) = 15.75, p < .01). Disconfirmation did not differ between the 
consumer-authored (M = 4.65) and provider-authored conditions (M = 4.44, F(1, 151) = 




5.30) and provider-authored conditions (M = 5.16, F(1, 151) = .40, p = .53) 
 

















  N = 40 N = 40 N = 40 N = 40 N = 40 
Expectations 5.50 (.93) 5.25 (1.10) 5.20 (.99) 5.30 (.94) 5.40 (.87) 
Perceived Risk 2.75 (1.30) 2.93 (1.35) 2.63 (1.17) 3.03 (1.49) 2.85 (1.41) 
Uncertainty 2.51 (.92) 2.64 (.88) 2.71 (.94) 2.94 1.16) 2.85 1.01) 
            
Rating 4.58 (.71) 4.22 (.97) 4.18 (.75) 4.13 (.88) 3.55 (1.09) 
Originality 4.63 (.59) 4.58 (.68) 4.22 (.73) 4.08 (.80) 3.45 (.99) 
Customization 4.40 (.90) 4.08 (.97) 3.93 (.97) 3.88 (.99) 3.18 (1.08) 
Detail 4.30 (.94) 3.73 (1.38) 3.65 (1.12) 3.70 (1.09) 3.00 (1.11) 
Speed 4.63 (.74) 4.45 (.82) 4.18 (.84) 4.35 (.66) 3.93 (1.10) 
Attribute Ratings 4.49 (.66) 4.21 (.71) 3.99 (.73) 4.00 (.64) 3.39 (.82) 
      
Expectancy Disc. 5.05 (1.48) 4.63 (1.62) 4.25 (1.45) 4.25 (1.41) 3.73 (1.54) 
Provider Control 5.35 (.50) 6.00 (.86) 4.67 (.81) 4.00 (2.24) 5.47 (.89) 
Satisfaction 5.58 (1.45) 5.30 1.45) 5.05 (1.43) 5.00 1.47) 4.40 (1.39) 
Trust 6.14 (.90) 5.88 1.01) 5.68 (.92) 5.77 (1.15) 5.22 (1.19) 
Reliability 6.11 (1.05) 5.98 (1.11) 5.74 (.91) 5.74 (1.15) 5.14 (1.37) 
Integrity  6.18 (.81) 5.79 (1.02) 5.63 (1.05) 5.80 (1.18) 5.24 (1.12) 
 
10.2.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
 
Next, the hypotheses were tested. Hypothesis H6.1 was tested with ANCOVA. I expected 




conditions because the providers set the expectations themselves based on the ratings 
they gave. Providing some support for H6.1, provider control was marginally higher in the 
provider-authored (M = 5.52) compared to the consumer-authored ratings conditions (M 
= 4.19; F(1, 10) = .35, p < .10). The low number of observations may have impacted this 
result. Despite the fact that the text in each logo was misspelled, and that the logos were 
delivered late, only 41 participants in the non-control conditions (26%) experienced 
negative disconfirmation. Future studies should test this hypothesis with a larger sample.  
 
Next, a moderation analysis (PROCESS Model 1, Hayes 2018) was used to test H6.2. I 
expected that perceptions of provider control would be especially high when the 
provider-authored ratings were five-stars (compared to mixed ratings) because the 
provider in the mixed ratings conditions may be perceived to be more honest about their 
relative lack of abilities and thus less responsible for the poor performance. The main 
effect of provider-authored ratings was not significant (β = -.16, SE = .68, p = .82) but the 
main effect of the five-star rating score was marginally significant (β = 1.4, SE = .70, p < 
.10). The predicted interaction between rating author and rating score was not significant 
(β = 1.32, SE = 1.42, p = .37) which again likely was impacted by the low number of 
observations. However, a planned contrast revealed that provider control was 
significantly higher in the provider-authored five-star ratings condition compared to the 
three other (non-control) conditions combined (F(1,10) = 7.33, p < .05; See Figure 15). 






Figure 15: Comparison of Provider Control Across Conditions 
 
Next, the final two hypotheses were tested. I expected that the higher level of perceived 
provider control for missed expectations in the provider-authored five-star ratings 
condition would lead to lower perceived integrity (H6.3) and subsequently lower ratings 
(H6.4) compared to the consumer-authored five-star condition. The hypotheses were tested 
with linear regression for the five-star ratings conditions. The chosen provider and the 
logo design template were used as covariates. Supporting H6.3, integrity was significantly 
lower when the five-star ratings were provider-authored compared to when they were 
consumer-authored (β = .-41, SE = .20, p < .05; see Figure 16). As expected, subsequent 
analyses revealed that reliability (β = .-15, SE = .23, p = .53) and satisfaction (β = .-27, 
SE = .31, p = .39) did not differ between the provider-authored and consumer-authored 
ratings conditions. Supporting H6.4, the ratings (i.e., the final ratings that were chosen by 
the participants after their experience) were significantly lower when the pre-experience 




(β = .-37, SE = .18, p < .05). This difference was also significant for the assessment of 
attention to detail (β = .-58, SE = .24, p < .05) and was marginally significant for 
customization (β = .-34, SE = .20, p < .10), and aggregate ratings (β = .-29, SE = .15, p < 
.10), such that these ratings were lower in the provider-authored conditions. There was no 
significant difference for the assessments of originality (β = .-06, SE = .14, p = .66) or 
speed (β = .-19, SE = .18, p = .29). Disconfirmation was also not significantly different 
between these two conditions (β = .-40, SE = .34, p = .24).  
 
 
Figure 16: Comparison of Consumer-Authored and Provider-Authored Five-Star Ratings 
Conditions for Integrity and Rating 
 
 
Finally, ANCOVA was used to probe the differences in ratings between conditions, and 
to estimate the size of the positivity bias. Ratings were significantly higher in the five-star 
conditions (M = 4.41) compared to the mixed ratings conditions (M = 4.14, F(1, 151) = 
4.25, p < .05). Aggregate ratings were also significantly higher in the five-star conditions 




.01).  This supports prior research that has shown that ratings behavior is significantly 
influenced by prior posted ratings (e.g., Moe & Trusov, 2011; Schlosser, 2005).  
 
Ratings were significantly lower in the control condition (M = 3.55) compared to all 
other conditions combined (M = 4.28, F(1, 191) = 21.74, p < .01). Planned contrasts 
revealed that the rating in the control condition was significantly lower than in each of the 
other conditions individually. As expected, on an average basis, the size of the ratings 
difference is largest in the consumer-authored five-star ratings condition (M = 4.58) 
compared to the control condition (M = 3.55), at over one point (i.e., 1.03) on the five-
star scale. Most reviews that consumers see when they are selecting providers in real 
peer-to-peer platforms are consumer-authored five-star ratings, so this difference of one 
point provides a good starting point for an estimate of the size of the positive ratings bias. 
Aggregate ratings were also significantly lower (M = 3.39) in the control condition 
compared to all other conditions combined (M = 4.17, F(1, 151) = 37.90, p < .01). I 
expected that the ratings bias in aggregate ratings would be lower than in actual ratings, 
but this was not the case. Again the difference was greatest between the consumer-
authored five-star ratings condition (M = 4.49) compared to the control condition (M = 




Study 6 tested the effects of a novel ratings system on attenuating the positive bias that 




providers but not will not forgive providers who lack integrity. The novel system was 
designed to elicit negative feelings of integrity after negative disconfirmation, by 
increasing the perception of provider control over performance failures. Study 6 did not 
elicit as much negative disconfirmation as anticipated, but nevertheless the study supports 
the predictions. Providers are perceived to have higher control over missed expectations 
when the pre-experience ratings are provider-authored and five-stars. This leads to lower 
integrity and lower ratings for the provider-authored ratings compared to the consumer-
authored ratings in the five-star condition. Thus, peer-to-peer platforms can reduce the 
positivity bias by assigning responsibility to providers to set their own attribute ratings. 
 
The study further attempted to calculate the size of the positivity bias. Results showed 
that ratings in the control condition were between 0.5 points to 1 point lower than the 
other conditions (on a five-star scale). This difference is likely a conservative estimate of 
the positivity bias, because a portion of participants may not have felt sure that the ratings 
exercise was real, and others may not have felt a strong need to justify ratings because 
they are not members of the peer-to-peer platform and providers cannot harm them with 




Chapter 3  
 
11 General Discussion 
 
The goal of this thesis was to explain the important problem of positive bias in peer-to-
peer ratings, and to provide potential solutions for platforms. To tackle this problem, I 
endeavored to develop a deep understanding of how consumers evaluate peer-to-peer 
experiences, and how unique contextual factors in peer-to-peer exchanges (compared to 
commercial exchanges) affect the relationship between performance evaluation and 
ratings. In this chapter, I will explicate the main contributions of the thesis as a whole, 
explore the limitations and directions for future research, and provide final thoughts about 
the positive bias in peer-to-peer ratings. For a summary of results of the hypothesis tests 




In this thesis, I have developed empirical support for the notion that trust is an important 
factor for peer-to-peer evaluations, and that evaluations of trust, in the form of reliability 
and integrity, contribute to the positive bias in peer-to-peer ratings. The thesis makes 
three main contributions. The first contribution is the demonstration that expectancy 
disconfirmation leads to evaluations of trust (in addition to satisfaction). Research on 
product and service evaluation is most often informed by the well-established expectancy 




performance against their prior expectations, and the resultant satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction leads to a variety of behaviors including word-of-mouth (Anderson, 1998; 
Homburg et al., 2005). The model has been supported across many contexts. However, I 
demonstrate that the model works differently for peer-to-peer services. Study 1 shows 
that, in a peer-to-peer service, the consumer’s determination of whether the peer provider 
met or did not meet their expectations has an effect on provider ratings that is above and 
beyond the effect of satisfaction. This suggests that there may be missing mediators 
between expectancy disconfirmation and ratings. I demonstrate that one of these 
mediators is trust.  
 
Trust is closely related to satisfaction, and is also associated with word-of-mouth 
(Ranaweera & Prabhu, 2003). However, the link between expectancy disconfirmation and 
trust is not well-established in extant research. I explain why expectancy disconfirmation 
leads to trust, and demonstrate the moderators of this effect (uncertainty, provider 
causality, provider control). Study 2B and Study 3 show that when uncertainty is high, a 
provider can demonstrate their trustworthiness by meeting the consumer’s expectations. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, consumers must place their trust in the provider and in 
their claims, with hope that they will not act with opportunism. If the consumer’s actions 
are rewarded, and the provider meets their promised claims and commitments, then the 
provider can be trusted. Although these studies were designed to understand how 
consumers evaluate peer-to-peer services, the findings about how uncertainty affects trust 




where uncertainty is expected to higher, such as new product innovations, or credence 
goods like car repair. 
 
The relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and trust may operate differently 
when expectations are negatively disconfirmed. Trust assessments include perceptions of 
reliability and integrity. Study 5 demonstrates that when expectations are negatively 
disconfirmed, the locus of causality for the service failure affects the consumer’s 
perception of the provider’s reliability. Study 5 further demonstrates that when 
expectations are negatively disconfirmed, a provider will be considered to lack integrity 
only if the provider is deemed to have control over the performance failure. If so, and if 
the provider lacks integrity, then this may ultimately lead consumers to post lower ratings 
for their provider. This finding was further tested in Study 6. 
 
The second contribution is to demonstrate the different causes of the positivity bias in 
peer-to-peer ratings. I demonstrate that contextual factors that are unique to peer-to-peer 
services contribute to the ratings bias through network effects and social norms. These 
biases are different than the self-selection bias (driven by satisfaction) that leads to the j-
shaped ratings distribution in many commercial products and services (Schoenmüller et 
al., 2018). The Pretest Study confirms extant research suggesting that the review rate is 
much higher in peer-to-peer services (Fradkin, 2017). Thus, consumers with moderate 
opinions are more likely to be included in the peer-to-peer compared to the commercial 




significantly differ between peer-to-peer and commercial services and that satisfaction is 
not the main driver of the consistently positive ratings in peer-to-peer services. 
 
Table 2 provides a list of proposed contextual differences in peer-to-peer services that 
could potentially bias the ratings for peer providers. Each of these differences were 
mostly (but not always) supported in the package of studies. Among these, the Pretest 
Study shows that network-related contextual effects cause consumers to feel that their 
ratings are more important to peer providers than commercial providers, and to feel a 
higher need to justify their ratings to peer providers than commercial providers. The 
perceived importance of ratings is higher in peer-to-peer networks because providers rely 
on them as their only means of customer acquisition, and because the platforms reward 
and punish providers based on ratings. Thus consumers may not want to unnecessarily 
harm peer providers with low ratings. Relatedly, because most peer-to-peer ratings are 
two-sided, consumers feel a need to justify their ratings decisions to providers and may 
fear that providers can retaliate against them. Study 3 shows that these network effects 
can bias peer-to-peer ratings by weakening the effect of satisfaction (but not trust) on 
ratings and by motivating consumers to post higher overall ratings than may otherwise be 
deserved. This can lead to highly positive ratings even when a provider’s performance 
merely met expectations and was only moderately satisfying. 
 
Studies 5 and 6 showed that consumers of peer-to-peer services may give highly positive 
ratings even when their expectations are negatively disconfirmed (i.e., when the service 




provider causality and provider control may be more difficult to determine for peer-to-
peer services, because providers are not professionals and the standards of evaluation are 
less clear. However, even if a peer provider is deemed to have caused a service failure, 
and is thus considered to be unreliable, a consumer may give the provider positive ratings 
because they feel the pressure of social norms. Peer-to-peer exchanges, which blend 
economic and social exchange (Sundararajan, 2019), lead to feelings of gratitude and 
empathy because peer providers have invited consumers to share their homes, personal 
items, and time and space with them (Albinsson & Yasanthi Perera, 2012; Hamari et al., 
2016; Hellwig et al., 2015). These norms motivate consumers to forgive unreliable 
providers for product failure. That is, social norms weaken the effects of perceptions of 
unreliability on ratings. However, if a provider lacks integrity, social norms no longer 
apply. By prioritizing their own interest over the interests of the consumer, the provider 
has moved the relationship into a purely economic rather than a social exchange. The 
provider’s lack of integrity gives consumers the justification to give lower ratings, 
regardless of social norms. 
 
The third contribution is the development and demonstration of three different potential 
solutions that platforms could use to help attenuate the positive ratings bias for peer-to-
peer services. First, to attenuate the bias from the network effects of perceived ratings 
importance and need to justify ratings, peer-to-peer platforms can help consumers to feel 
that their ratings are anonymous. Study 3 demonstrated that when ratings are aggregated, 
and believed to be anonymous, they are less important. Similarly, consumers won’t feel 




leads to lower overall ratings which may be more reflective of a provider’s true 
performance. Many platforms, such as Airbnb, already attempt to anonymize ratings. 
They do so by not releasing ratings to providers until an individual provider has been 
rated by multiple consumers. After a certain number of consumers have rated a provider, 
the aggregate rating is released to the provider, and also publicly on the platform website. 
However, when the next consumer makes a rating, the provider could see how the 
aggregate rating is changed, and may be able to infer whether the consumer rated them 
positively or poorly. Whether they do so or not, is not important. What is important is 
whether a consumer believes that the provider can determine their individual rating. In a 
separate survey of RVezy consumers, I asked participants to tell me whether they rated 
their provider completely honestly or whether their rating was inflated. If the rating was 
inflated, I asked them to explain why they made that choice. Participants indicated that 
they were worried that a provider may react to a low rating by giving the participant a 
low rating as retribution. But RVezy releases ratings to providers and consumers 
simultaneously, so in practice, ratings retribution is not possible. Again, it is the 
consumer’s perception, rather than reality, that is important. RVezy and other platforms 
should do more to anonymize ratings and to communicate with their members in a way 
that clearly explains how their anonymity is protected. 
 
The second way to attenuate ratings bias is to make standards of evaluation more clear in 
peer-to-peer services. Study 5 demonstrated that consumers of peer-to-peer services are 
relatively unclear about the standards against which they should evaluate their peer 




whether a provider was the cause of the consumer’s missed expectations. If consumers 
are unclear about evaluation standards, it is difficult to make a definitive assessment that 
the provider failed. Consumers may instead blame themselves for missed expectations. 
Study 5 further showed that when a platform can more clearly define the performance 
standards for peer-to-peer services, consumers can more easily identify performance 
failure and hold providers accountable for that failure. Ratings will be lower, which may 
be more reflective of a provider’s true performance. However, as further demonstrated, 
social norms may weaken the effect of unreliability, and so ratings may still be somewhat 
biased. To completely remove these biases, platforms need to make it more easy to assess 
both causality and controllability, because it will affect perceptions of provider integrity.  
 
Study 6 attempted to increase provider causality and controllability through a novel 
ratings system that represents the third way that platforms could attenuate the positive 
ratings bias. This new system puts the onus on providers to rate themselves on several 
attributes. Consumers can use their ratings to help select a provider, and can also base 
their expectations on the ratings. Providers will be expected to rate themselves honestly, 
and if they fail to meet those standards, consumers should feel that the provider caused 
and controlled the negative outcome. Study 6 demonstrates that when ratings are 
provider-authored, and especially if they are all five-stars, negative disconfirmation leads 
to perceptions that the provider lacks integrity. Ratings will be lower, which may be more 
reflective of a provider’s true performance. There are several other potential advantages 
to this new rating system. First, it should help to differentiate quality, because providers 




stand out, based on their higher attribute ratings. Second, assuming that the ratings are 
accurate, future guests should have better experiences and higher satisfaction, because 
experiences will more often meet expectations. Third, the proposed system may 
encourage providers to improve their quality over time. In the current system, when 
providers learn that consumers will give a high rating even for mediocre quality, they 
may decide to cut back their effort. However, in the new system, providers may want to 
improve quality so that they can honestly give themselves a higher rating for each 
attribute. In sum, the proposed ratings system should help to fix the positive bias, leading 
to more satisfactory experiences for consumers, and a desire to remain in the platform to 
purchase additional service experiences in future. 
 
11.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
 
I tested my propositions in online and lab studies, and in a field experiment with 
consumers of a peer-to-peer service for recreational vehicles. In each case, I endeavored 
to promote realism in the studies. To properly mimic the contextual factors in peer-to-
peer services, it was important that participants believed that they were participating in a 
real service experience, and that their ratings mattered for their provider and for the 
business or platform. This is because the moderating factors of uncertainty, risk, network 
pressures, and social norms do not operate the same if participants know they are taking 
part in a study. Overall, I believe that I was successful in maintaining the deception, as 
demonstrated by the fact that 90% of participants in Study 2B felt somewhat to 




not believe the deception may have contributed to some of the non-significant results in 
the studies (for example the moderating effect of uncertainty on trust in Study 2A). 
 
I learned that it is very difficult to elicit negative disconfirmation while trying to maintain 
the deception of a real service experience. For example in Study 4, the manipulation was 
not heavy-handed enough in creating a poor product experience with the free cookie. I 
didn’t want to arouse suspicion with a product that was objectively very bad. Thus I was 
not able to test most of the hypotheses in that study. However, I was able to successfully 
elicit negative disconfirmation in Study 5, which then allowed me to test all of the 
hypotheses. Similarly, the manipulations in Studies 2A and 2B did not drive significant 
differences in uncertainty and perceived risk. Again, I didn’t want to arouse suspicion by 
making the privacy warnings too explicit. The level of uncertainty and perceived risk in 
studies 2A and 2B respectively were also relatively low overall which likely impacted the 
manipulation. The service experiences in those studies (resume design and graphic 
design) may have worked better if they were reversed. 
 
The studies supported the majority of the propositions depicted in my conceptual models, 
but there were some unexpected results. For example, the results of Study 2B did not 
support the prediction that perceived risk moderates the effect of trust on ratings. A 
subsequent analysis in Study 2B and Study 3 demonstrated that perhaps perceived risk 
may indeed increase the importance of trust on the relationship with ratings, but through 
its effect on satisfaction rather than directly. When risk is high, and the consequences of 




are met, with no surprises. This finding should be tested in future research, and has 
implications for many categories both within peer-to-peer and commercial services in 
which perceived risk may be high. This includes, for example, services such as home 
renovations, e-commerce, and extreme sports.  
 
Finally, I learned that a consumer’s evaluations of peer-to-peer services may operate 
differently depending on the type of service and the level of sharing involved. I tested 
many different categories of services including food services, design services, 
recreational vehicle rental, and accommodation services. Perceptions of provider 
causality and controllability, and consumers feelings of gratitude and empathy may 
operate differently in peer-to-peer services that are skills-based, compared to those in 
which a peer provider shares their personal possessions and space with the consumer. 
These differences may have contributed to some of the non-significant results (for 
example, the fact that social norms of gratitude and empathy were not higher for peer-to-
peer services compared to commercial services in Study 4). Future research should test 
these differences between different types of peer-to-peer services, and their effects on 
trust and ratings. 
 
11.3 Final Thoughts 
 
The peer-to-peer sharing economy is a large and growing industry, and one that is 
dependent on trust. However, the positive bias in peer-to-peer ratings makes it difficult to 




system and the platform itself. Indeed in Study 6, I find that the average peer-to-peer 
rating is one point higher (on a five-star scale) than the objective quality of the service 
(based on the ratings in a control condition). Study 6 was an online study that was not 
able to mimic all of the real contextual effects of peer-to-peer platforms (for example it 
did not include a two-sided review system), so the ratings bias may actually be even 
higher. Despite these concerns, little progress has been made in demonstrating the cause 
of the bias and how it can be fixed by the platforms. A notable exception is the research 
on Airbnb by Fradkin (2017) which shows that the threat of retaliatory behavior is an 
unintended consequence when consumer and provider ratings are not released 
simultaneously. This unintended threat does not fully explain the positive bias (Fradkin, 
2017), and most platforms (including Airbnb) now post ratings simultaneously. Therefore 
the effects of overt retaliatory behavior on ratings have largely been removed (Bridges & 
Vásquez, 2016). Thus, I do not consider these retaliatory effects in my studies.  
 
Some researchers have proposed alternative causes for the positive ratings bias (e.g., 
Filippas et al., 2018; Mulshine, 2015) but they not have explicated the mechanisms of 
their proposed causes. I attempted to address this issue by exploring how peer-to-peer 
consumers evaluate their service experiences differently (i.e., through trust), and how this 
difference, in concert with network and social factors that are unique to the peer-to-peer 
context, lead to high ratings for peer providers. In doing so, I strive to make both a 
theoretical contribution and a practical contribution, that includes possible solutions that 
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Appendix A: List of Propositions 
  
P1 Consumers rate their providers based on an evaluation of perceived quality 
compared to initial expectations. For commercial services, the satisfaction that 
results from this evaluation is the primary driver of ratings. In contrast, for peer-to-
peer services, expectancy disconfirmation evaluations affect ratings outside of 
satisfaction. 
  
P2 If a consumer is relatively uncertain that a provider is able and willing to deliver 
positive outcomes as expected, the provider’s fulfillment of those expectations has a 
stronger impact on the consumer’s perceptions of trust than if they were relatively 
certain about outcomes. 
  
P3 If an exchange carries a relatively high perceived risk, the provider’s trustworthiness 
is an important performance attribute which should be reflected in their rating.  
  
P4 Peer-to-peer services ratings will reflect the consumer’s trust in the peer provider, in 
addition to the consumer’s satisfaction with the experience. 
  
P5 When expectations are confirmed (i.e. merely met), trust will be higher than 
satisfaction. 
  
P6a Because satisfaction is relatively subjective, the effect of satisfaction on ratings will 
be reduced when consumers feel that ratings are very important to peer providers and 
when they have a strong need to justify their ratings.  
  
P6b When ratings are considered to be very important to their providers, consumers will 
post higher ratings for their provider than they post when ratings are considered less 
important. 
  
P7 If a consumer is not certain that a provider caused a performance failure, then the 
effect of negative disconfirmation on perceptions of provider reliability is weakened.   
  
P8 If a consumer is not certain that a provider had control over a performance failure, 
then the effect of negative disconfirmation on perceptions of provider integrity is 
weakened.   
  
P9a When gratitude and empathy are high, consumers will post higher ratings for their 
provider than when gratitude and empathy are lower. 
  
P9b Gratitude and empathy will cause consumers to forgive a provider for unreliable 
service, but not if the provider is deemed to lack integrity. Thus, when negative 
disconfirmation occurs, gratitude and empathy weaken the effect of reliability on 

















Appendix D: Stimuli for Study 1 
 
Commercial Business Condition 
 
 











Appendix F: Email from Graphic Designer to Participants in Study 2A 
 






Appendix F Continued: Email from Graphic Designer to Participants in Study 2A 
 
Established + Commercial Condition 
 
 
New + Peer-to-Peer Condition 
 
 





Appendix G: Example Resume Designs for Study 2A 
 
 
Original Resume from Participant 1 
 
 

























































Appendix O: Accommodation Options in Study 5 
 






























































Appendix U: Summary of Results of Hypothesis Tests 
 
Study Hypothesis Supported? 
   
1 1.1 For commercial services, the relationship between expectancy 
disconfirmation and ratings is fully mediated by satisfaction  Yes 
      
1 1.2 For peer-to-peer services, expectancy disconfirmation has both 
a direct effect and an indirect effect through satisfaction on ratings Yes 
      
2A 2.1 Expectancy disconfirmation is positively related to trust in the 
service provider Yes 
      
2A, 2B,          
and 3 
2.2 Uncertainty moderates the relationship between expectancy 
disconfirmation and trust; this relationship will be stronger when 
uncertainty is higher. 
Unclear 
      
2A, 2B 2.3 Trust is positively related to ratings Yes 
      
2B 2.4 Perceived risk moderates the relationship between trust and 






2B 2.5 When uncertainty and perceived risk are high, expectancy 
disconfirmation is positively related to ratings, and is mediated by 
trust in the service provider. 
Unclear 
      
3 3.1 Satisfaction is positively related to ratings. Yes 
      
3 3.2 A need to justify ratings decisions moderates the relationship 
between satisfaction and ratings; this relationship will be weaker 
when need to justify is higher. 
Unclear 
      
3 3.3 Perceived ratings importance moderates the relationship 
between satisfaction and consumer ratings; this relationship will 
be weaker when ratings importance is higher. 
Yes 
      
3 3.4 Perceived ratings importance is positively related to ratings. Yes 
      
2B, 3 3.5 Trust is positively related to satisfaction. Yes 
      
2B, 3 3.6 Perceived risk moderates the relationship between trust and 








Appendix U Continued: Summary of Results of Hypothesis Tests 
 
Study Hypothesis Supported? 
   
5 5.1 Clarity of standards is positively related to perceptions of 
provider causality Yes 
      
5 5.2 Negative disconfirmation is negatively related to perceptions 
of provider reliability Yes 
      
5 5.3 Negative disconfirmation is negatively related to perceptions 
of provider integrity Yes 
      
5 5.4 Provider causality moderates the relationship between 
negative disconfirmation and reliability; this relationship will be 
stronger when provider causality is higher 
No 
      
5 5.5 Provider control moderates the relationship between negative 
disconfirmation and integrity; this relationship will be stronger 
when provider control is higher 
Yes 
      
4, 5 5.6 Social norms of gratitude and empathy are positively related 
to ratings. Yes 
      
5 5.7 When expectations are negatively disconfirmed, social 
norms moderate the relationship between reliability and ratings; 
this relationship will be weaker when social norms are higher  
Yes 
      
6 6.1 Compared to consumer-authored ratings, provider-authored 
ratings lead to higher perceived provider control Unclear 
      
6 6.2 The rating score moderates the relationship between 
provider-authored ratings and provider control; this relationship 
is stronger when the rating score is five-stars 
Unclear 
      
6 6.3 When the rating score is five-stars, provider-authored ratings 
lead to lower perceptions of provider integrity compared to when 
ratings are consumer-authored 
Yes 
      
6 6.4 When the rating score is five-stars, provider-authored ratings 
lead to lower post-experience ratings compared to when pre-
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